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ABSTRACT 
M . T h . A . Pieterse and H.J . Si lvis 
The World Coffee Market and the Internat ional Coffee Agreement 
Wageningen, Pudoc, 1988 (X + 105 p . , 27 t a b . , 10 f i g . ) 
Based on research done at the Internat ional Coffee Organizat ion, th is r e -
por t presents a descr ip t ive analysis of the world coffee market . The 
emphasis is on the coffee p r i ce , which is studied from the angles of p ro -
duc t ion , consumption, t rade and the Internat ional Coffee Agreement. 
The Agreement - a commodity agreement operat ing wi th expor t quotas -
can be regarded as a consumer-supported producers ' ca r te l , o r ig ina l ly 
dominated by Braz i l . Brazi l 's decl in ing share of product ion as well as of 
s tocks, has exacerbated the already d i f f i cu l t decision making on quotas 
and pr ices. The problems of the ICA, inc luding the allocation of quotas, 
the increase of the non-quota market as well as the short fa l ls and under-
shipments, have hampered consensus among both producers and con-
sumers. However, i t is expected that producing countr ies wil l t r y to 
regulate the market , even in the absence of a consumer-supported agree-
ment. 
Coffee / Internat ional Coffee Agreement / Export quotas / 
Commodity Agreement / Internat ional agr icu l tura l t rade 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Coffee is the most important tropical commodity in international 
agricultural trade. This report presents a descriptive analysis of the 
international coffee market and its regulation by the International Coffee 
Agreement ( ICA). The focus of attention is on the price of coffee. Many 
questions can be raised about this. What are its determinants? Which 
characteristics of supply and demand can explain its short term and long 
term development? What role is played by the International Coffee 
Agreement? How does this agreement regulate the market? With what suc-
cess? What kind of problems are encountered? For which problems has a 
solution been found? 
The research on these questions was largely done at the International 
Coffee Organization (ICO) in London, where literature was researched in 
the extensive l ibrary, available statistics were collected and interviews 
were held with staff members and representatives of member countries. 
The findings of the research initially served as an M.Sc. thesis for 
Agricultural Economics and Policy (Pieterse, 1987). 
From an international perspective, production and consumption of coffee 
are clearly separated. Production is restricted to the (sub)tropical re-
gions of the world, whereas consumption is concentrated in Western 
Europe, North America and Japan. A large number of exporting countries 
is heavily dependent on coffee for the foreign exchange earnings. In 
1985, coffee exports constituted more than 25 percent of the total export 
revenues of sixteen countries (see table 1.1). On the other hand, 
imports of coffee form only a minor share of the total value of imports of 
industrialized countries. However, in these countries, coffee-drinking 
forms a very important element in the dominant lifestyle. 
Coffee prices on the international market tend to be very volatile. 
Apart from monetary factors that may destabilize commodity markets col-
lectively, the coffee market has to cope with cyclical imbalances between 
supply and demand and with occasional harvest failure. A frost in Brazil, 
Table 1 . 1 . Export value of coffee as a percentage of total expor ts fo r 
selected countr ies in 1985. 
Brazi l 
Colombia 
Cote d ' Ivo i re 
Indonesia 
Costa Rica 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Kenya 
Tanzania 
Ethiopia 
Benin 
10.3 
50.9 
24.7 
2.9 
33.5 
73.0 
41.4 
24.4 
31.3 
38.4 
49.8 
55.5 
Cameroon 
Madagascar 
Burund i 
Haiti 
Rwanda 
Sierra Leone 
Uganda 
Central A f r ican 
Nicaragua 
India 
Mexico 
Republic 
29.0 
38.2 
96.6 
29.2 
66 .2 1 
22.1 
94.2 
45.8 
41.4 
3.1 
2.5 
1
 1984 f i g u r e . 
Source: ICO, Quar ter ly Statist ical Bul let in 36, 1986. 
i 
the main producing coun t r y , can have a considerable impact on total 
supp ly . Th is can lead to large pr ice react ions, often aggravated by 
speculative behaviour on the fu tu res market . 
The stabi l izat ion of coffee prices is the prime objective of the In terna-
tional Coffee Agreement ( I C A ) . This producer and consumer based agree-
ment was f i r s t established in 1962 and was renewed in 1968, 1976 and 
1983. With a number of i n te r rup t ions , the ICA has regulated the wor ld 
coffee t rade by means of expor t quotas which res t r i c t members' expor ts to 
import ing member markets. Cu r ren t l y the agreement covers 99% of produc-
t ion and some 85% of global consumption. The ICA numbers seventy - f i ve 
member count r ies , f i f t y producing countr ies and twen ty - f i ve consuming 
countr ies. 
Al though the Coffee Agreement has certain unique features , i t is not 
the only internat ional commodity agreement. In the 1947 Charter of 
Havana, the members of the United Nations agreed to s t r i ve fo r in te rna-
tional commodity agreements between producing and consuming count r ies . 
Figure 1 . 1 . Schematic representat ion of the s t ruc tu re of th is repor t . 
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' The objective was to reduce commodity pr ice vo la t i l i t y . An important 
reason fo r th is was to help developing count r ies , which had to cope wi th 
severely f luc tua t ing expor t earn ings. 
Two systems of pr ice stabi l izat ion were descr ibed. Supply was to be con-
t ro l led ei ther by expor t quotas or by a buf fer stock agreement, while st i l l 
al lowing market forces to work in the f reest possible sense. Regulation 
was only allowed when the balancing of supply could not be effectuated 
by normal market forces alone. Agreements were to aim at a reasonable 
degree of pr ice s tab i l i ty on the basis of such prices as were fa i r to the 
consumer and remunerat ive fo r the ef f ic ient producer , and expansion of 
product ion was to take place by the most ef f ic ient producer . Commodity 
agreements were meant to stabi l ize, not to increase pr ices. Increases in 
income fo r expor t ing countr ies were to be reached via growth in demand. 
Vot ing r igh ts in the commodity organizations were to be d is t r ibu ted 
equally among producers and consumers. And f i na l l y , the agreements 
were to be jo in t l y admin is t rated. 
The framework prov ided by the Charter of Havana has led to a number 
of agreements of which the most important are fo r wheat, sugar , t i n , 
r ubbe r , cocoa and coffee. In 1964 the specific task of promoting and 
organiz ing commodity agreements was taken up by the newly established 
Unctad, which was to prov ide a platform fo r the debate on relations 
between developed and developing countr ies. In 1976 in the search to 
establish a Common Fund , the Integrated Program fo r Commodities was 
proposed. This f und was to serve as a basis fo r the f inancing of bu f fe r 
stock act iv i t ies fo r ten 'core' (most important) commodities. However, th is 
proposal fo r the benef i t of developing countr ies has st i l l not been rat i f ied 
by the industr ia l ized count r ies . Tak ing into consideration the changes in 
the internat ional polit ical appreciat ion of commodity agreements, the 
Integrated Program must therefore be considered a fa i l u re . 
The only three major commodity agreements, cu r ren t l y funct ion ing are 
those fo r cocoa, rubber and coffee. The T in Agreement collapsed in 1985 
because of f inancial problems, and the Sugar Agreement, operat ing wi th 
expor t quotas, was not renewed in 1984 because i ts coverage of the wor ld 
market was too small. The Cocoa and the Rubber Agreements both operate 
by means of a bu f fe r s tock. The Rubber Agreement was f i r s t established 
in 1979. The Cocoa Agreement is much older. In 1986 its members decided 
on a fourth agreement. With the exception of the United States, all impor-
tant producing and consuming countries are members. 'At the moment, the 
Coffee Agreement is the only international commodity agreement that 
operates through export quotas. This statement needs some qualification, 
in that, at the time of wri t ing, the member countries have not been able 
to decide whether to implement the quotas or not in spite of low coffee 
prices. This issue is dealt with in Chapter four. 
The structure of the report is quite simple. A schematic representation 
of the structure is given in Figure 1.1. This shows that the main focus is 
on the price of coffee. In the next four chapters, this price is studied 
from the angles of production, consumption, trade and the Coffee Agree-
ment. 
Chapter Two reviews the characteristics and historical developments of 
production and marketing. Chapter Three is devoted to consumption and 
processing of coffee in the industrialized countries. The bridge between 
production and consumption is formed by international trade, and Chapter 
Four describes the actors and channels via which this trade is conducted. 
Many elements of production, consumption and trade are helpful in the 
analysis of the International Coffee Agreement, as is seen in Chapter Five 
which explains how the Agreement is operated. There is also a review of 
international interventions in the coffee market. The evolution of the 
Agreement to its present form is marked by the problems which were 
encountered in these undertakings. Disputes between members of the 
Agreement are analyzed and the chapter concludes with an assessment. 
Finally, in Chapter Six the conclusions of this study are summarized. 
PRODUCTION 
2.1 Introduction 
How do production and marketing in producing countries determine 
world coffee prices? How do world market prices of coffee influence pro-
duction and marketing in these countries? These questions form the sub-
ject of this chapter. A survey of the botany and ecology of the two main 
types of coffee, and the areas of the world where they are cultivated, is 
followed by a brief analysis of production systems and production costs. 
Next the volume and structure of world production are discussed, and the 
marketing systems in producing countries are described, with special at-
tention to the three predominant organization forms. Hereafter the relation 
between world market prices and producer prices is analyzed. Finally 
there is a discussion of short and long term production characteristics of 
coffee. 
2.2 Botany and ecology 
Coffee is a tree crop. The f i rst harvest is about three to four years 
after planting and it takes two to three years more before the tree 
reaches its normal yield. Yields normally start to decline about fifteen 
years after planting, but under good management, the drop in production 
is not rapid, and the tree can have an economic life of up to f i f ty years. 
The quality of the coffee can vary greatly. This is not only because of 
the type of coffee but is also caused by natural conditions and methods of 
handling and processing. The two main types of coffee are Arabica and 
Robusta, and production areas are determined by the different climatic 
requirements of the two species. 
Arabica is responsible for 78% of world production. It is an upland 
species, requiring an average annual temperature of between 18-25°C, 
with minimum temperatures around "13°C and maximum temperatures not 
exceeding 30°C. On the equator Arabica is found between 1700 and 2500 
m, but in Braz i l , at a lat i tude of 24°, i t can be grown at an a l t i tude of 
on ly 100-200 m. Arabica is ve r y susceptible to f r o s t s , which can damage 
not only the cu r ren t c rop , bu t also f u t u r e crops i f the t ree i tself is 
af fected. Arabica needs a rainfal l of 1500-2500 mm well d is t r ibu ted 
th rough the year wi th a d r ie r period of two to three months (De Graaf f , 
1986; p. 29) . In low rainfal l areas, i r r iga t ion is requi red or arrangements 
need to be made to conserve soil moisture. Too much rainfal l is more 
easily to le ra ted. The t ree is ra ther susceptible to diseases (leaf r u s t ) 
which necessitates spray ing wi th herbic ides. Often shade trees are 
planted to conserve a certain stable microclimate, bu t at h igher al t i tudes 
wi th intensive cul t ivat ion and optimum inpu ts , higher yields are obtained 
wi thout shade. 
Arabica condit ions are par t icu la r ly well met in Central America, in coun-
t r ies along the Andes, in some parts of B raz i l , and some areas in East 
Af r ica and Madagascar. Only a few areas in Asia ( fo r example India and 
Indonesia) possess the requi red condi t ions. What is remarkable is the low 
su i tab i l i ty of large (especial ly southern) areas in B raz i l , which resul ts in 
periodic crop fa i lu res . 
Robusta is the second major t ype of coffee, w i th 22% of wor ld produc-
t i o n . The t ree shows a wider adaptabi l i ty than Arab ica, bu t th r i ves best 
under warm equatorial climates wi th an average temperature fo 24-26°C. I t 
grows best at lower al t i tudes (300-800 m ) , and requi res a h igh rate of 
humidi ty all the year round . Optimum rainfal l of 1700 mm, va ry i ng be-
tween 1000 and 2500 mm/year should be well spread over 9-10 months. 
The Robusta coffee t ree is hard ier than Arab ica, bu t i t suf fers from root 
r o t , which is d i f f i cu l t to cont ro l . A major pest is the coffee be r r y borer , 
and can affect the berr ies even af ter d r y i n g . Shade trees are planted to 
avoid extreme ecological condit ions such as too much or too l i t t le sun and 
humidi ty (De Graaff , 1986; p .29) . 
Suitable zones fo r Robusta are found over large areas of West A f r i ca , 
the lower regions of Central and South America and the Caribbean as well 
as large par ts of South East Asia. 
2.3 Production systems and cost of production 
Systems of coffee production are very diverse, ranging from large 
estates to smallholder units. In Brazil, coffee is mainly produced by large 
specialized coffee estates, 47% of its production coming from farms larger 
than 100 ha (De Graaff, 1986; p. 112). In Africa, coffee is mainly pro-
duced by diversified smallholders, with an average farm size of 2 ha. In 
the other Latin American countries medium sized holdings between 5 and 
30 ha predominate. A survey of the average yield and farm size of coffee 
producers in the world is presented in Table 2 .1 . 
In many countries however, there exists a dual production structure of 
large estates with high yields, high input cost production next to small-
holdings with low cost production. In Africa there is a tendency for 
smallholder production to increase in importance, and this is reflected in 
a declining output share of estate production. In Zaïre, Kenya and 
Tanzania, for example, plantations used to be more important (Dinham and 
Hines, 1983; p. 54), but new production units are predominantly set up 
by small farmers. 
For production factors and inputs, material inputs have become in-
creasingly important, especially for intensively cultivated Arabica. How-
ever, the most prominent production factors in coffee production are still 
land and labour. 
The two factors are combined in varying ways according to their rela-
tive scarcity. Whereas smallholder production is typically labour intensive, 
estate production in Brazil is labour extensive and seasonal labour is 
hired during harvest periods. Material inputs (fert i l izer, pesticides) are 
rarely used by African smallholders. 
Mechanization has taken place in estates in Brazil, where tractor inputs 
are used for land preparation and mechanical harvesting takes place by 
means of tree shaking. Labour requirements for harvesting usually con-
stitute half of the total labour input (De Graaff, 1986; p. 77). 
Cultivation practices are largely determined by rainfall. In areas of low 
rainfall either mulching (by smallholders) or supplementary irrigation is 
required. In areas with high rainfall, weed control is a major activity, 
requiring considerable labour inputs or herbicides. 
Table 2*1 . Average yield and farm size of coffee producers in the world 
(1979-1980). 
World 
S. America 
Brazi l 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Peru 
C. America 
Costa Rica 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Haïti 
Mexico 
Afr ica 
Angola 
Cameroon 
Ethiopia 
Ivory Coast 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Rwanda 
Uganda 
Zaire 
Asia and Oceania 
India 
Indonesia 
Phil ippines 
Papua New Guinea 
Yield 
( k g / h a ) 
540 
600 
600 
700 
350 
600 
750 
1100 
1100 
700 
300 
600 
350 
200 
400 
300 
350 
700 
400 
700 
500 
350 
700 
700 
600 
1100 
1000 
Size of 
plantat ion 
(ha) 
6 
11 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
6 
15 
1 
4 
2 
30 
3 
0.2 
2 
0.5 
1 
0.1 
0.5 
5 
3 
3 
0.5 
4 
5 
App rox . area 
under small 
holdings (%) 
n . a . 1 
n.a . 
n .a . 
n .a . 
90 
n .a . 
n .a . 
60 
20 
99 
70 
90 
10 
90 
95 
95 
70 
90 
99 
95 
30 
70 
n.a . 
80 
60 
50 
1
 n.a. - not applicable: no clear cut difference between large and smal 
farm sectors. Source: De Graaff, 1986; p. 33. 
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These inputs can be avoided by interplanting with annual crops or by 
growing the coffee shrubs under shade trees (bananas). 
Most coffee farmers are usually diversified, as labour requirements for 
coffee show distinct peaks. Smallholder production but also production on 
medium and large estates in Latin America are complemented by staple 
food production and, for larger farms, extensive crops or livestock pro-
duction. 
Table %,2. , Yield, average production cost and prices to growers, for 
selected countries, in 1982. 
\ \ t ' 'N 
Count ry 
Brazi l 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Kenya 
estates 
smallholders 
Rwanda 
Cameroon 
Arabica 
Robusta 
Ivory Coast 
Indonesia 
Y ie ld 1 
600 
800 
1200 
1100 
600 
700 
200 
400 
300 
500 
Average cost 
per k g 1 
(US $) 
1.20 
1.70 
1.10 
1.95 
1.30 
1.20 
1.70 
0.90 
0.90 
0.80 
Average pr ice 
paid to grower per k g 2 
(US $) 
1.38 
1.74 
1.24 
2.89 
2.89 
2.62 
1.02 
1.02 
0.88 
1.10 
1
 De Graaf f , 1986. 
2
 ICO QSB 36, 1986. 
It is diff icult to assess average production costs for coffee. These can 
be divided into the four main categories of labour, land, material inputs 
and other costs, including depreciation on equipment and an annuity on 
establishment costs. On average, labour accounts for at least half of the 
11 
J 
product ion costs. Establishment costs of a coffee plantat ion cannot be 
neglected, and also consist largely "of labour investments. For the f i r s t 
three to f i ve years , no yields are obtained from the t rees , whereas labour 
inputs are requi red fo r cu l t i va t ion . As labour costs are hard to measure, 
data on product ion costs must be handled wi th care. In Table 2.2 some 
average cost f i gu res , estimated by De Graaff , are presented. These 
f igures are compared wi th the average pr ice paid to the grower . 
From the f igures i t may not be concluded tha t coffee product ion is 
always a ve ry prof i table ac t i v i t y . De Graaff (1986; p. 81) concluded t ha t , 
in genera l , net re tu rns are low and in years of average and low p r î t es , 
net re tu rns in several countr ies are insuf f ic ient fo r proper maintenance 
and reinvestment. 
2.4 Volume and s t ruc tu re of wor ld product ion 
In recent years total world coffee product ion has not great ly increased, 
as is indicated in Table 2 .3 . 
Table 2 .3 . Total wor ld product ion of coffee, crop years 1978/79 to 
1985/86. 
Crop year 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
Total wor ld product ion 
(000 bags) 
81.438 
76.578 
99.192 
82.650 
94.664 
82.839 
96.757 
84.551 
Source: ICO QSB 35, 1986. 
12 
P< More remarkable is the instability of total world production. On close 
examination however, production fluctuations in Brazil seem to have been 
almost solely responsible, as world production volume, excluding Brazil, 
has been rather stable. 
The incidence of frosts and droughts in Brazil has thus strongly 
affected world output levels. Table 2.4 gives a survey of registered 
frosts in coffee-producing regions. The very grave frost of 1975 was 
such that the production in consecutive years was also affected as the 
trees themselves were damaged, and not only as with minor frosts, the 
berries, flowers or leaves. The period from May to September (the Brazil-
ian winter) is most prone to frosts. 
The frosts in major Brazilian producing areas have caused parallel f luc-
tuation in world production. The correlation coefficient between annual 
production fluctuations in Brazil and the world amounted to 0.93 from 
1960 until 1980 (Akiyama, 1982; p.7). This correlation is clearly demon-
strated in Figure 2 .1 . 
Figure 2 . 1 . World and Brazil's coffee production 
mln bags 
1 0 0 1 — 
2 0 
0 
A , ~ ' " * ' World excluding Brazil 
'^/v 
VBrazil v V 
• i I i ' I i i I i i I i i I i i I i i I | i | i i I i i I i i I i i | i 
1949 '52 '55 '58 '61 '64 '67 '70 '73 '76 '79 '82 '85 
year 
Source: Akiyama, 1982. 
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This figure illustrates an other feature of world coffee production. 
Brazil used to hold a very large share of world production, and this 
share has been steadily eroding. Other countries have increased their 
share in the market that has grown considerably since the Second World 
War. 
Table 2.4. Registered frosts in coffee regions of Brazil, 1931 to 1985. 
Date 
Interval in years 
Intensity Moderate Grave Very grave 
29 Jun 1931 moderate 20 1 / 19 2/ 13 3/ 
14 Jul 1933 moderate 2 
12 Jun 1942 grave 30 
15 Sep 1943 moderate 10 
5 Jul 1953 grave 11 
2 Aug 1955 grave - 2 -
21 Jul 1957 grave - 2 
7 Jul 1962 moderate 19 
22 Jun 1963 moderate 1 
28 Jun 1964 moderate 1 
21 Aug 1965 moderate 1 
6 Aug 1966 grave 9 
8 Jun 1967 moderate 1 
11 Jul 1969 moderate 3 
9 Jul 1972 moderate 3 
18 Jul 1975 very grave - - 44 
15 Aug 1978 moderate 6 - -
31 May 1979 moderate 
20 Jul 1981 moderate 3 - -
1985 (number of years 
since last frost) (4) (19) (10) 
1 / June 23rd, 1911 
2/ September 3rd, 1912 
| / June 25, 1918 
Source: Institute Agronomico Campina, Brazil. 
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However, Latin America is st i l l the dominant product ion area wi th two-
th i r ds of world product ion in 1984/ 85. Brazi l ranks f i r s t wi th 33%, and is 
followed by Colombia wi th 11% of wor ld p roduct ion . Other large coffee 
Table 2 .5 . Coffee product ion of selected count r ies , crop years 1978/79 to 
1985/86 (mil l ion bags of 60 k g ) . 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Indonesia 
Ivory Coast 
Mexico 
Ethiopia 
Guatemala 
Cameroon 
El Salvador 
India 
Kenya 
78/79 
21.3 
12.7 
4.8 
4.9 
4.4 
3.2 
2.8 
1.6 
3.4 
1.8 
1.2 
79/80 
17.4 
12.2 
5.0 
4.1 
3.7 
3.1 
2.5 
1.7 
3.0 
2.6 
1.7 
80/81 
34.4 
13.1 
5.8 
6.2 
3.9 
3.3 
2.7 
2.0 
3.2 
2.0 
1.7 
81/82 
18.7 
14.5 
4.8 
4.2 
4.1 
3.2 
2.6 
2.0 
2.8 
2.5 
1.5 
82/83 
28.0 
12.3 
5.9 
5.0 
4.6 
3.7 
2.5 
2.0 
3.2 
2.2 
1.5 
83/84 
21.4 
13.0 
6.2 
1.7 
4.8 
3.9 
2.4 
1.0 
3.2 
1.5 
2.0 
84/85 
32.6 
11.0 
6.0 
4.9 
4.3 
2.3 
2.8 
1.6 
2.2 
4.0 
1.6 
85/86 
16.7 
12.3 
5.7 
5.0 
4.6 
3.1 
2.8 
2.5 
2.4 
2.3 
2.2 
Source: ICO QSB 35, 1986. 
producers are Indonesia, the Ivo ry Coast, Mexico, Ethiopia, Guatamala, 
Cameroon, El Salvador, India and Kenya. Together these eleven countr ies 
account for almost 80% of total wor ld coffee product ion . Recent product ion 
data fo r these countr ies are given in Table 2 .5 . 
From th is table i t must be concluded tha t Brazi l had a ve ry low p ro -
duct ion f i gu re in 1985/86. Its share of wor ld product ion fel l even below 
20%. If th is f i gu re is compared wi th histor ical data , the fal l of the 
Brazi l ian share of the market is dramatic. I t is in terest ing to take a 
closer look at th is development. 
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A t the beginning of th is cen tu r y , in 1906, Brazi l had a product ion 
share of 84.5%, and an expor t market share of 70%. Because of th is 
h igh market share, and the low prices on the wor ld market , Brazi l s ta r t -
ed uni lateral action to raise pr ices. These actions took the form of expor t 
rest r ic t ions and national s tockp i l ing . The pol icy was called 'valor izacion' , 
to value h i g h . Brazi l pursued th is policy unt i l 1940, to be followed by 
internat ional in tervent ions ei ther coordinated by a group of producers or 
by a g roup of producers and consumers. 
Brazi l 's policy has cer ta in ly cont r ibuted to the gradual decline of i ts 
market share (see Figure 2 . 2 . ) . The uni lateral reta in ing of coffee from 
the world market , in order to sustain wor ld market pr ices, stimulated 
competitors such as Colombia and the Central American count r ies , which 
lie close to the most important consumer the US, to take advantage of i t 
and increase product ion . A t the same time European powers were en-
couraging supplies from the i r Af r ican colonies, thus securing the i r supply 
of coffee and lessening the i r dependence on Latin American coffee. 
Figure 2 .2 . Export market shares on the wor ld coffee market , 1909-1984. 
Asia and Oceania 
Colombia 
Central Americav 
J I L I I L _L J I L 
1909- I l9-| 29. '46 '48 '50 '52 '54 '56 '58 '60 '62 '64 '66 '68 '70 '72 '74 '76 '78 '80 '82 '84 
13 14- „ 24- 34-
ie23283338 year 
S o u r c e : G e e r , 1972; ICO QSB 3 6 , 1986. 
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In the late 1950's and early 60's the fall of the Brazilian share of the 
market speeded up. World production then increased at an unprecedented 
rate of 20 percent per annum. Although Brazil initially also attained 
higher production levels, in the long run it could not sustain them. In 
1962 the conclusion of the f i rs t International Coffee Agreement was to 
freeze export market shares by export quota. But even under this 
protection Brazil could not hold its traditional position. In the Appendix a 
more detailed account is presented of production developments this cen-
tu ry . 
2.5 Marketing in producing countries: systems and producer prices 
Most of the coffee-producing countries export virtually all the coffee 
they grow. Brazil, India, Indonesia and Mexico are among the few 
countries where domestic consumption is substantial. As with production 
systems there is a large diversity among producing countries in their 
marketing systems. This is not only caused by differences in production 
systems (smallholders/estates), but also by differences in the way of 
processing (washed or unwashed). Moreover, several institutional factors 
also contribute. 
For the purpose of explanation, marketing systems can be said to con-
sist of the marketing channel on the one hand, and the so-called market-
ing authority on the other. For the latter, governments influence the 
marketing processes. Government influence, in whatever form, is neces-
sarily large because of the imposition of export quotas within the frame-
work of the ICA. In some countries a large share of government revenues 
is formed by taxes on coffee exports. This also explains high government 
involvement. 
Originally the marketing channel had a simple structure. In most coun-
j tries production was undertaken by large farmers and businessmen, who 
\ either took care of the export themselves or sold their product to inter-
| national traders. Gradually, however, most marketing channels have 
become more complex. The usual marketing channel now consists of 
I growers, processors, brokers and other intermediairies, domestic roast-
17 
ers, wholesalers, retailers and exporters. Members of each group may 
perform more than one marketing function. Some growers still handle 
coffee 'from harvest through to export, and some exporters handle both 
the processing and exporting functions. 
Marketing channels differ between the various countries according to 
the commercial type of coffee, the size and type of production units and 
the methods of processing. Unwashed Arabica and Robusta only need sun 
drying (or mechanical drying) which generally takes place on the farms. 
The removal of the husks by hand or machine is undertaken either by 
farmers, cooperatives, private millers as in Brazil, or is done in the 
village as in Indonesia. In the Ivory Coast centralized processing plants 
do all the processing and marketing of Robusta coffee. The washed 
Arabica from Central America, Colombia, Kenya and Tanzania has to be 
processed by fermentation and requires washing facilities. This is under-
taken by farmers if the scale of production justifies own installations 
(Colombia) or by cooperatives if only small quantities are produced per 
farmer, as by the smallholders in Kenya. These cooperatives may also 
engage in further marketing and export and may provide members with 
loans and storage facilities. The scale of farming is often determinant for 
the participation of the farmer in further processing and marketing, as is 
the existence of governmental and private facilities. 
In conclusion, it should be noticed that marketing channels, however 
diverse, are usually long. This holds particularly for smallholder produc-
t ion, where the many institutions involved in the marketing operations 
contribute to considerable trade margins (De Graaff, 1986; p. 55). These 
margins are also influenced by governmental policies, operating through 
marketing authorities. 
Marketing authorities can be divided in three categories (Unctad, 1982; 
p. 40): 
1. the 'marketing board'-type, prevalent in English-speaking coffee-pro-
ducing countries (e .g . Kenya, Nigeria, India); 
2. the 'caisse de stabilisation'-type found in many Francophone coffee-
producing countries (e .g . Côte d' Ivoire, Cameroon, Madagascar); 
3. the quasi governmental coffee producer's associations and 'institutes' 
common in Latin America (e .g . Brazil, Colombia, Mexico). 
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The 'marketing boards' usually have a legal monopoly on the purchase 
of the entire coffee crop. All coffee is sold to the board, which is then 
responsible for grading and storing, until the coffee is resold on the ex-
port market. The board usually makes an initial payment to producers 
based on the average price actually received. What margin is retained is a 
matter of national policy. In Kenya, the policy is to maximize returns to 
growers, while in Tanzania the margin between purchase and selling price 
is an important source of government revenue. 
The 'caisse de stabilisation'-type of agency usually does not take phys-
ical posession of the coffee. It f i rs t establishes a price which private cof-
fee buyers must pay to coffee growers, and then absorbs the difference 
between that price and the export price the exporting buyers receive. It 
fixes thus transport and marketing margins for purchasing agents and 
exporters. Guaranteed grower prices are usually substantially below the 
world market price. In some cases the agency regulates a number of other 
crops besides coffee, and can operate in such a way that net revenues 
from its activity with established crops (such as coffee) encourage ex-
panded production of other crops. 
The th i rd type of marketing authority is the 'coffee institute'-type. 
This coffee marketing authority generally establishes a guaranteed mini-
mum price at which growers can sell their coffeebeans to one of the ware-
houses spread through the country. Pricing arrangements between grow-
ers and private exporters however are usually left to the free market if a 
more advantageous price is quoted here. The IBC (Brazil) and FNC 
(Colombia) are further engaged in various activities around the produc-
tion of coffee. Besides export and control of private export by means of 
the setting of minimum export prices, they undertake research, the 
storage of excess production which they buy at the guaranteed minimum 
price and the supply at the national market. They provide technical 
assistance and credit to farmers and coordinate the national coffee policy 
in close cooperation with the government. On average, farmers in 
Colombia and Brazil received 47% and 42% of the world market price in 
1984, which is not low compared with what farmers in many African 
countries receive. However, there are also countries that pay higher 
producer prices. 
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Table 2.6. Prices paid to growers in selected countries (1978-1984)* 
(US$ cts/ lb) 
Country 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Indonesia 
Ivory Coast 
Mexico 
Guatemala 
Cameroon 
El Salvador 
Kenya 
1978 
75 
84 
84 
51 
96 
93 
52 
92 
154 
1979 
72 
80 
80 
56 
97 
91 
42 
109 
160 
1980 
48 
83 
68 
64 
109 
97 
47 
73 
147 
1981 
53 
78 
38 
50 
95 
82 
53 
59 
115 
1982 
60 
78 
45 
41 
68 
87 
46 
68 
121 
1983 
42 
75 
51 
37 
56 
93 
41 
63 
120 
1984 
53 
70 
39 
37 
72 
114 
40 
71 
112 
* Years ending September. (1 lb = 0.453 kg) . 
Source: ICO QSB, various issues. 
Table 2.6 is a survey of prices paid to growers. It is clear that large 
differences exist in price levels at the farm level. The interpretation of 
these price differences, however, is rather diff icult. It is certainly not 
only a matter of commercial margins, public taxes and pricing policies of 
the marketing authorities. Also qualitiy differences are reflected in the 
data and comparison is further complicated by changes in the exchange 
rate. 
Another view of producer prices is presented in Table 2.7, which 
relates prices paid to growers to world market prices. 
The fact that Kenya maximizes returns to producers is clearly reflected 
in its high figures. On the other side of the spectrum are the Ivory 
Coast and Cameroon, where the 'caisse de stabilisation'-type of agencies 
f ix comparatively high margins. 
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Table 2.7. Prices paid to growers as a percentage of world market price 
(Arabica or Robusta price as appropriate) for selected countries (1978-
1984)*. 
Country 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Indonesia 
Ivory Coast 
Mexico 
Guatemala 
Cameroon 
El Salvador 
Kenya 
1978 
46 
52 
57 
34 
59 
57 
36 
57 
95 
1979 
42 
46 
48 
34 
56 
53 
37 
63 
92 
1980 
44 
54 
46 
44 
71 
63 
46 
47 
95 
1981 
42 
61 
36 
48 
74 
64 
52 
46 
90 
1982 
43 
56 
40 
37 
49 
63 
41 
49 
86 
1983 
32 
57 
41 
29 
42 
70 
33 
48 
91 
1984 
37 
48 
28 
26 
50 
79 
29 
49 
78 
* Years ending September. 
Source: ICO QSB, various issues. 
2.6 Production characteristics 
Production of coffee in producing countries is determined by both the 
tree stock level and the rate of production, i.e. yields per hectare. Input 
use (ferti l izer and labour) to a certain extent influences yields, and 
forms a variable factor, which in the short term can be varied by farmers 
in response to prices. Weeding and crop care can be intensified. How-
ever, the tree stock in the short term is f ixed, and, after planting, it 
takes 6-8 years for a coffee tree to produce in fu l l . 
Variations in world coffee production from year to year are, as des-
cribed above, mainly due to weather influences (Brazilian f rosts) . Other 
factors are plantings that come into production, abandonment of planta-
tions, tree damage and the two-year bearing cycle. This biennial cycle 
(Parikh, 1979; p. 219) has been attributed to the strain suffered by the 
tree from a heavy crop, with the result that the next year's crop is 
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light. Over a large geographical area though the biennial cycle can be 
evened out. 
When looking at the reactions of producers to world market prices it 
should be remembered that these price signals are transformed by the 
marketing authorities. Price elasticities have been measured and are 
described below. 
Because of its production characteristics, the price elasticity of coffee 
production is, in the short term, very low. The long term elasticities, 
however, seem to be fair ly high. For the major producers Brazil, Colom-
bia and Indonesia, high long term elasticities of supply have been cal-
culated by Akiyama. In his data the supply response to the extremely 
high prices prevailing in the years 1977-1979 has been incorporated. In 
the generally lower elasticities calculated by Singh, the full impact of the 
risen prices could not be taken in account. The different estimates are 
given in Table 2.8. 
Singh has an interesting explanation for the differences in supply res-
ponse in various regions. He discerns two major factors; the importance 
of coffee within total agriculture, and the type of coffee holdings. 
In a country where agriculture is largely devoted to coffee cultivation, 
both short and long term elasticity of supply tend to be low. With low 
prices, cultivation is not likely to be neglected since the farming sector 
and the country as a whole depend heavily on the product, there being 
little alternative sources of income. This applies specially to Colombia (51% 
of export earnings from coffee in 1985), El Salvador (73%), Guatemala 
(41%), Honduras (24%), Costa Rica (34%) and Nicaragua (41%). In the long 
term, according to Singh (1977; p. 32), since a large portion of agri-
cultural land is already occupied by coffee, the possibilities for expansion 
are limited. Akiyama though concludes for Colombia a higher price elasti-
city of supply than Singh. 
Exactly the opposite holds for countries where coffee is an agricultural 
product of only minor importance. In times of low prices governments 
tend to neglect the coffee sector and farmers switch to other products. 
When prices rise, farmers devote more attention to the crop and expand 
production. This applies to Indonesia, where coffee formed 2.9% of all 
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Table 2 .8 . Price elasticit ies of supp ly . 
Count ry 
Brazi l 
Colombia 
North and Central 
America and Caribbean 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Afr ica 
Ivo ry Coast 
Asia 
Indonesia 
Rest of the wor ld 
World Total 
Short term 
1* 
0.093 
0.0673 
0.207 
0.110 
0.55 
0.285 
0.0771 
0.12 
2 * * * 
0.20 
0.03 
0.03 
0.12 
0.10 
Long term 
1 * * 
1.10 
0.96 
0.56 
0.50 
0.73 
1.05 
0.38 
0.739 
2 * * * * 
0.44 
0.18 
0.14 
0.44 
0.43 
3 
0.66 
0.40 
0.77 
1.87 
3.01 
1 . Akiyama, T . , 1982; p. 15. 
2. S ingh , 1977; p. 27. 
3. I b i d , fu l l adaptat ion. 
* Short run elasticit ies refer to product ion response to pr ices in 
ei ther or the previous year , except fo r Brazi l where the lag is 
two years . 
* * Long run elasticit ies refer to the effect of a 1% change on produc-
t ion af ter ten to th i r teen years . 
* * * One year lag. 
* * * * Seven years lag. 
exports in value in 1985, and where the government in ter feres only 
s l igh t ly in market ing and t rade (De Graaf f , 1986; p. 253). 
The type of holding is the second factor Singh dist inguishes in ex-
plaining d i f f e r ing pr ice elasticit ies of supp ly . The estate sector general ly 
shows a higher shor t term elast ic i ty of supply than the smallholders sec-
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tor. In times of low prices the smallholder may pay little attention to the 
cultivation, but always at least picks part of the crop. An estate holder 
does have alternative uses for his funds and will invest in other activi-
ties. The smallholder though has few alternative opportunities for his 
labour, even when prices fall and remain low. 
For high prices, Singh (1977; p. 32) finds no reason to assume signi-
ficant differences between smallholders and estates on the basis of the 
type of holding. More important is the availability of land for expansion, 
for then estates are able to expand at a faster rate than smallholdings 
because large investments are needed to develop new land for agricultural 
production. Brazil has a relatively high price elasticity, reflecting the 
predominance of large estate production and high government interfer-
ence. Colombia and Central American countries are heavily dependent on 
coffee, and small to medium sized production units predominate, indicating 
the relation Singh expected. Indonesia is an expanding producer, with 
predominantly smallholders and a low dependence on coffee, with a high 
price elasticity. 
Finally, looking at the world price elasticities of coffee supply, it is 
clear that the long term price elasticity is rather significant. This causes 
a serious problem for the world market. In combination with weather-born 
price fluctuations, these elasticities may set in motion long term produc-
tion cycles. The rate in which these cycles affect world market prices 
depends however on demand reactions. This issue is further treated in 
the next chapters. 
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3. CONSUMPTION 
3.1 Introduction 
Coffee consumption is concentrated in the industrialized countries. It is 
also in these countries that processing takes place, whereby the green 
beans are turned into roasted or instant coffee. This chapter looks at the 
relation between consumption and world market price. How does demand in 
consuming countries affect world coffee prices? And how does world mar-
ket price influence processing and consumption? 
First, attention is paid to the volume and structure of consumption. 
The technique of processing is then summarized, in order to explain the 
large scale organization of the sector. The fact that economic as well as 
political factors bind processing to consumption centres forms the next 
subject. The chapter concludes with a discussion of consumption charac-
teristics. 
3.2 Volume and structure of consumption 
Consumption of coffee in producing countries is restricted to Central 
and South American countries and a few countries in Africa. Total con-
sumption in these countries averaged eighteen to twenty million bags in 
the 1980's, amounting to 20% of total production. The rest is consumed in 
the so-called consuming countries. 
These are clearly the industrialized countries. In 1984/85 the EC 
(48.2%), US (30.4%) and Japan (6.4%) accounted jointly for 85% of world 
imports. EC imports have been growing steadily from 23.6 million bags in 
1974/75 to a current 30.9 million bags, whereas US imports during the 
same period declined from 20.4 million to 19.5 million. Japan forms one of 
the growth markets, showing an ample doubling of imports in this period 
(see Table 3.1). 
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Within the EC, the Federal Republic of Germany (9 .2 million bags) , 
France ( 5 . 7 ) , I ta ly ( 4 . 8 ) , the Netherlands (2 .8 ) and the United Kingdom 
(2 .6 ) account for the largest share of imports. Per capita consumption in 
the EC is highest in Denmark wi th 11 kg per caput , followed by the 
Netherlands (9 .5 kg) and Germany (6 .8 k g ) . 
Table 3 . 1 . Coffee imports by EC, US and Japan 1974/75-1984/85 (mil l ion 
bags of 60 k g ) . 
Year 
74/75 
75/76 
76/77 
77/78 
78/79 
79/80 
80/81 
81/82 
82/83 
83/84 
84/85 
EC 
23.6 
26.0 
24.1 
23.1 
28.7 
27.3 
28.7 
29.3 
30.8 
29.7 
30.9 
US 
20.4 
21.8 
18.4 
17.2 
21.9 
20.1 
18.0 
18.6 
18.5 
19.6 
19.5 
Japan 
1.9 
2.7 
2.8 
1.5 
3.3 
3.2 
3.2 
3.5 
3.8 
4.3 
4.1 
Source: ICO WP-Board 625/86, 1986 
In Table 3.2 these f igures are compared wi th per capita consumption in 
producing countr ies. Per capita consumption in the US has shown a con-
stant decline since 1962. Th is has general ly been a t t r i bu ted to subs t i t u -
t ion by other beverages (sof t d r i n k s , juices and tea) and a growing 
anxiety fo r the assumed negative impact of coffee on health ( ICO, Coffee-
d r i nk ing S tudy , 1986). Absolute imports of the US in 1985 equalled those 
of 1970 (19 million bags) wh ich , since the population increased, i l lustrates 
the fal l in per capita consumption. Th is notable t rend in consumption by 
the single most important consuming count ry is par t ia l ly of fset by growth 
in Japanese imports, where the habi t of co f fee-dr ink ing is replacing that 
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of tea. Th is is also t r u e , to a minor extent in the UK. The Centra l ly 
Planned Economies show an increase in imports of 3.2 million bags in 1975 
to 4.5 in 1985 (European Coffee Federat ion, 1986; p. 1 ) . 
Table 3 .2 . Coffee consumption per capita in kg/person 1985. 
Consuming 
Sweden 
Denmark 
Finland 
Holland 
Germany 
France 
I taly 
countr ies 
United States 
Spain 
United Kin 
Japan 
gdom 
11.6 
11.0 
10.1 
9.5 
6.8 
5.5 
4.9 
4.7 
2.7 
2.5 
2.2 
Producing countr ies 
Costa Rica 
Brazi l 
Colombia 
Guatemala 
Ethiopia 
Ivo ry Coast 
6.5 
5.5 
4.5 
4 
3 
2 
Source: ICO QSB 36, 1986 
Coffee fo r consuming countr ies comes from a d ive rs i t y of count r ies , 
depending on the preference of the local consumers for certain tastes and 
on the avai labi l i ty of certain coffees. Some generalization though can be 
made. Bierman (1986; p. 2) states tha t countr ies wi th a h igh per capita 
consumption general ly have a high combined Arabica import share ( e . g . 
*• F in land, 98%, Germany 90%, Sweden 99%) whereas countr ies wi th a rela-
t i ve ly young t rad i t ion of co f fee-dr ink ing show a h igh Robusta share ( e . g . 
the UK 41%) and consume mainly instant coffee ( U K , Japan) . France and 
I taly on the cont ra ry also have high Robusta shares, bu t th is can be 
related to the prox imi ty and former colonization of West Af r ican countr ies 
where Robusta is produced. French consumption switched to Robusta 
when product ion began to increase af ter the F i rs t World War. US con-
sumption has a high proport ion of instant coffee (20%), and typ ica l ly l igh t 
brews of unwashed Arabicas and Robusta coffee are prepared. 
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3.3 Processing 
At the processing stage of the coffee marketing chain in the consump-
tion centra, the green beans are transformed into roasted and/or instant 
(soluble) coffee. Decaffeination when desired is usually the f i rs t stage in 
the chain of processing before roasting. 
Roasting and grinding are usually preceeded by the blending of coffees 
from various parts of the world to obtain a taste to which the final con-
sumer is accustomed. Blending, roasting and grinding practices differ 
among markets as a result of differences in consumer preferences. 
Often a large number of different coffees are blended, and dependent 
on availability and cost price, manufacturing firms' melange experts mix 
consumer blends. The taste of these blends can vary within certain boun-
daries, without changing consumer perception. Firms t ry to keep the 
perceived final taste as constant as possible, as this forms one of the 
elements of consumer brand loyalty. The taste of a coffee bean blend is 
determined by 'blending types' and ' f i l lers'. A mild blend can consist of a 
changing percentage of Brazil's of the soft tasting Santos 4 type besides 
the blending type of Milds. Robusta and more bitter tasting Brazil's 
(Hards) cannot be blended in a high quality blend as they would destroy 
the mild flavour of the coffee blend. Blends aiming at a more bitter and 
stronger taste can be mixed from pure Brazils and increasing the relative 
bitterness, from Robustas. Within the three main groups - Milds, un-
washed Arabicas (or Brazils) and Robusta - large quality differences 
exist. 
Instant coffee manufacturing involves the extraction and dehydration of 
liquor from ground roast coffee. Although freeze drying can be applied at 
this stage, spray drying still accounts for the bulk of instant coffee 
produced (Gordon, 1979; p. 159). Usually lower grade coffees are used 
for instant coffees. 
Over the last two decades there has been a concentration of ownership 
tendency notable in the processing industry. In the sector of roasted 
coffee, which represents about 80% of all consumption in the largest con-
suming countries (Unctad, 1982; p. 60) a small number of enterprises 
account for a large share of the market (see Table 3.3.) . Acquisitions in 
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Table 3.3. Concentration ratio of roasted coffee industry in major con-
suming countries. 
four-f irm sales concentration ratio (%) 
Country a/ 1960 1978 
United States 
Federal Republic of Germany 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Denmark 
United Kingdom 
46 b/ 
49 
25 
11 
66 
35 
80 d / 
18 
-
69 c/ 
67 
60 
49 
86 
81 
90 
55 
70 e/ 
a/ Countries ordered by value of total coffee imports, 1976-1977. 
b/ 1958. 
c/ Preliminary. 
d / Three firms. 
e/ Two firms. 
Table 3.4. Concentration ratio of the soluble cofffee industry in major 
consuming countries. 
..-> 
Country a/ 
United States 
Federal Republic of Germany 
France 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Sweden 
Canada 
Spain 
Denmark 
Switzerland 
Norway 
Austria 
Greece 
Four-firm 
1968/1969 
85 b/ 
82 ~ 
97 
95 c/ 
90 c/ 
66 d / e/ 
94 d / 
96 
74 c/ 
92 c/ e/ 
100 
80 d / 
95 3 / 
75 d / 
90 c/ 
concentration ratio (%) 
1977/1978 
91 
94 
92 
86 c/ 
. . . 
80 
90 
92 c/ 
92 c/ 
a/ Countries ordered by value of total coffee imports in 1976-1977. 
b/ 1967. 
c/ Two firms. 
d / Three firms. 
e/ 1970-1971 
Source: Unctad 1983, p. 106. 
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the seventies led to a growing concentration in the coffee sector of almost 
all developed countries. The four firm sales concentration ratio in 1978 
varied from 49% of all sales in Italy to 90% in Belgium/Luxembourg. In the 
instant coffee sector this ratio is even higher. In both sectors, but 
especially in the instant sector Nestlé and General Foods (75% of world 
sales) have most sales in the most important markets (Unctad, 1982; 
p. 58). In the US (80% combined market share), France (90%), Japan 
(95%) and Germany (53%) this domination by both firms is striking (see 
also Table 3 .4 . ) . Several firms have expanded their activities towards 
markets in developing countries, where especially instant coffee is pro-
duced for the local market. Various transnationals had a large number of 
foreign affiliates. Nestlé is especially active in producing countries, and 
is said to limit its purchases to producers in countries where it has 
foreign affiliates (Dinham and Hines, 1983; p. 65) thereby exerting 
considerable influence over the coffee policies in those countries. 
3.4 Barriers to entry 
Where large processing companies from consuming countries t r y to pene-
trate markets of producing countries, one may wonder why processing is 
so tied to consumption centres. It is estimated that overall gross margins 
of trading, processing and distributing represent approximately a quarter 
of the retail price of coffee. It is further estimated that 50% of this price 
is due to manufacturing and distribution value added (Unctad, 1982). Why 
do not the producing countries have a larger part of the pie? What are 
the barriers to entry? 
For a number of reasons, the potential for exporting countries obtaining 
a higher share of the value added is limited. The processing of green 
beans into roasted or instant coffee is constrained by several factors. 
Single exporting countries cannot produce the exact blend of coffees pre-
ferred by Western, especially European consumers. The blend composition 
function gives the roasting industry a strong competitive advantage over 
coffee exporters, impeding them from setting up their own industry. Fur-
thermore, roasted coffee rapidly loses flavour if not vacuum packed. 
Technological knowhow, especially in the soluble industry, is patented, 
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and large scale product ion of fers advantages of scale, is capital intensive 
and requires only a small labour fo rce . Also, the coffee i ndus t r y is 
character ized by heavy adver t i z ing , h inder ing en t r y of new b rands . 
Table 3.5. Ta r i f f rates for g reen , roasted and instant coffee of major 
import ing countr ies in 1985. 
US 
EC 
Japan 
Canada 
Austr ia 
Finland 
Norway 
Switzerland 
New Zealanc 
Austra l ia 
green 
0 
5% (0% 
fo r ACP) 
0% 
0% 
0-13% 
0(LDC)-3.9% 
0% 
8.3-10.4% 
0 
0-2% 
(decaf fe in-
ated) 
0 
13% 
(ACP 0%) 
roasted (decaffein 
ated) 
0 0 
15% 18% 
(ACP 0%) (ACP 0%) 
20% 
0.7% 
0(LDC)-15% 
16% 
2.3% 
8.1-11.6% 
0-25% 
1.1% 
- e x t r a c t s , es-
sences and 
concentrates 
0 
18% 
(ACP 0%) 
0% (LDC)-30% 
1.4% 
0(LDC) 
8.8% 
0-0.2% 
14.4% 
0-35% 
0-7.5% 
Source: Compiled from EB 2546/85, ICO London, 1985. 
Another factor is tha t import ing countr ies general ly apply ta r i f f s to 
imports of processed coffee from expor t ing count r ies , whereas green 
coffee is not taxed at the borders . The US, however, places no ta r i f f s on 
coffee. The EC also forms a s l igh t exception to the ru le . ACP countr ies 
\ receive preferent ia l t reatment from the EC and have zero t a x , whereas 
j processed coffee from non-ACP countr ies is charged wi th an import du t y 
of 18% (see Table 3 . 5 . ) . 
Imports from ACP countr ies account fo r 42% of imports of green coffee, 
and the ta r i f f c lear ly gives ACP countr ies an advantage over Latin 
American count r ies . Japan charges imports of processed coffee heavi ly 
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wi th ad valorem taxes of 20-35%. Government revenues from coffee imports 
in 1979 were estimated at 232 million US dol lars of which the EC and 
Japan accounted fo r most of th is (Unc tad , 1982; p. 88) . 
Also non- ta r i f f bar r ie rs are applied as is shown by the famous case of 
the Brazi l ian/US dispute on instant coffee in 1968. Within a ve ry shor t 
period Brazi l obtained a market share of 15% on the US soluble market , 
due to i ts ab i l i ty to use low qual i ty cheap coffee. A lobby of US manu-
fac turers in the Congress forced the Brazi l ian government to expor t a 
similar amount of tax f ree coffee to the US soluble f i rms in order to re -
store f ree competition (see Payer, 1975; p. 165). Brazi l ian soluble coffee 
expor t soon lost g round again in the US. 
Another element which is important in coffee market ing and the coffee 
t rade is the existence of internal taxes and subsidies (not related to i n -
ternat ional t r a d e ) . A number of European count r ies , such as the Federal 
Republic of Germany, I ta ly and the Nether lands, have h igh excise taxes 
on coffee p roduc ts . These taxes date from the time when tropical p ro -
ducts were considered luxur ies . The amount generated by these taxes is 
qui te s ign i f icant . For the Federal Republic of Germany i t has recent ly 
been estimated at close to 400 million US dol lars (Unc tad , 1982; p. 47) . 
3.5 Consumption character is t ics 
Consumption of coffee in industr ia l ized countr ies is t rad i t iona l ly i n f l u -
enced by two fac to rs ; the retai l pr ice of coffee and general income per 
capita developments. Late ly, especially in the US, a growing awareness of 
the assumed negative impact on health has also repor ted ly led to the 
subst i tu t ion of coffee by other beverages such as tea, juices and soft 
d r i n k s . Th is t r e n d , isolated from pr ice or income ef fects , can also, to a 
minor ex ten t , be observed in West Germany. 
Estimates of pr ice and income elasticit ies of demand fo r the major con-
suming regions have been prepared by Singh (1977) and Akiyama (1982) 
(see Table 3 .6 ) . Singh (1977; p. 38) demonstrated tha t US-income elas-
t i c i t y declined from 0.243 in 1950 to an estimate of 0.001 in 1985. For 
other importers a similar bu t less steep decline was est imated, from 1.046 
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in 1950 to 0.536 in 1985. This indicates that in recent years the response 
of coffee consumption to additional income has decreased. The more recent 
study by Akiyama (1982; p. 13) showed similar results. US-income elas-
ticity was actually negative, whereas figures for EC, Southern Europe 
and Scandinavia are 0.697, 0.537 and 0.33 respectively. Central Europe, 
Japan and Centrally Planned Economies showed more growth potential 
when income increased. On a world scale, however, the absolute size of 
imports in these countries was still low. 
Table 3.6. Price and income elasticities of coffee demand. 
US 
Other 
EC 
Scandinavia 
South E 
Central 
Japan 
Central 
World 
iurope 
Europe 
ly Planned Economies 
Akiyama 
income 
-
-
0.597 
0.330 
0.537 
1.140 
1.990 
1.073 
0.448 
price 
-0.372 
-0.0677 
-0.1237 
-0.0971 
-0.0190 
-0.3963 
-0.1680 
-0.1860 
Singh 
income 
0.006 
0.643 
price 
-0.216 
-0.262 
Source: Akiyama 1982; Singh 1977. 
Akiyama estimated world-income elasticity of demand at 0.448, implying 
an increase of 4.48% of import demand when per capita income grew by 
10%. For short term price elasticities of demand, Akiyama showed high 
absolute values for the US and Japan and low values for the EC, Scan-
dinavia, Southern and Central Europe and, surprisingly, the Centrally 
Planned Economics (-0.168). A more recent study by Duncan (1986; p. 
23) assumed a value of -0.4, in the light of recent price competition on 
the non-member market for coffee (see 4.3) and the worsened reserve and 
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fore ign exchange si tuat ion of these economies. For the wor ld as a whole, 
Akiyama estimated the pr ice elast ic i ty of import demand at -0.186. In 
terms of pr ice format ion, th is is ve ry low. The low elast ic i ty of demand is 
an important factor behind coffee pr ice ins tab i l i ty on the wor ld market . 
Because product ion f luctuat ions are not easily absorbed by consumption 
adjustments, prices may fal l low or rise h i g h . Only at extremely high 
pr ice levels, such as in the period 1976/78 and more recent ly in 1986, 
does s t rong consumer resistance develop. 
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TRADE 
4.1 International trade 
On the world market a confrontation takes place between exporting and 
importing parties, with or without the mediation of traders. The prices of 
the various grades of coffee are thus formed in the meeting of supply and 
demand, the outcome being influenced by environment, market conditions 
and the strategy of the marketing participants. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to present a survey of the inter-
national marketing of coffee. First the structure of the world coffee 
market is analyzed. At the same time, the marketing channels through 
{ which trade is conducted are described. Special attention is paid to spot 
Î and futures markets as well as the transport system. This is followed by 
a description of the market participants and finally, the international 
market characteristics, especially price formation are analyzed. Some 
insight is offered into the supply and demand strategies of market par-
ticipants, as well as into determining conditions. 
4.2 Structure of the world market 
The international coffee market can be characterized as a bilateral dif-
ferentiated oligopoly. In both exporting and importing countries supply 
and demand are relatively concentrated. As coffee is not homogeneous, 
various (sub)markets are discerned (Geer, 1971; p. 71). Table 4.1 shows 
the origin of imports by major consuming countries. Figure 4.1 gives an 
illustration of price developments for different grades of coffee. 
Only a few countries export the bulk of all exports. In 1984/85 Brazil 
and Colombia, with 30% and 16% respectively of world exports were the 
largest, followed by Ivory Coast (8%), Uganda (5%), Indonesia (5%) and 
El Salvador (4%). Supply was even more concentrated in the past, when 
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Table 4 . 1 . Or ig in of imports by major consuming count r ies ; 1985. 
France: 
West-Germany: 
Japan: 
US: 
Ivory Coast ( 26 .6 ) , Brazil ( 23 .6 ) , Zaïre ( 7 . 5 ) , 
Colombia ( 6 . 7 ) , Madagascar ( 6 . 3 ) , Other (29 .4 ) . 
Colombia ( 20 .1 ) , Brazi l ( 18 .0 ) , Kenya ( 4 . 2 ) , 
El Salvador ( 6 . 9 ) , Ethiopia ( 4 . 2 ) , Other (31 .6 ) . 
Brazil ( 30 .0 ) , Indonesia (21 .4 ) , Colombia ( 13 .3 ) , 
Honduras ( 5 . 4 ) , India ( 5 . 2 ) , Other (248.) 
Brazil ( 23 .3 ) , Colombia (13 .6 ) , Mexico ( 8 . 9 ) , 
El Salvador ( 7 . 2 ) , Indonesia ( 6 . 0 ) , Other 41 .3 ) . 
Source: Pieterse, 1987. 
Figure 4 . 1 . Spot coffee prices for the New York market : 1953-1970. 
I f f » l»S4 IfSS 1*54 1*57 IffSI I tS* 1*40 1*41 1**1 1**1 1*44 1*4S 1*44 1*47 | *4 * 1*4* 1*70 
Source: Pan American Coffee Bureau, Annual Coffee Stat is t ics , 1969. 
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Brazil possessed a larger market share. 
Within the three main types (unwashed Arabicas, Mild Arabicas and 
Robustas) Brazil has virtually a monopoly for the unwashed Arabicas. 
Colombia is the main exporter of Milds, with El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Costa Rica as other major exporters. Ivory Coast, Indonesia and Uganda 
are most important exporters of Robusta. In the most important exporting 
countries the parastatal organizations have a large influence on export 
supply, as was shown in chapter 2. 
On the side of demand in the coffee manufacturing industry, for both 
washed and soluble coffee, a certain substitution within coffee grades is 
possible, without perceivably altering the taste for the final consumer. As 
such, these three partial markets are interrelated and distortion of sup-
ply-demand balances for one type will have an effect on other types. 
In the washed coffee industry, concentration is rather high in most 
consuming countries. In the instant coffee sector, General Foods and 
Nestlé dominate, and this gives rise to oligopsonistic buyers con-
centration, as especially in instant coffee the lower quality Robusta and 
unwashed Arabica are used. In the roasted coffee industry buyers 
concentation is not oligopolistic, although there are several large com-
panies involved. 
4.3 International marketing channels 
On the world market, coffee is mainly traded in the form of green cof-
fee. Two types of market distinguished for this coffee are the cash mar-
ket and the futures market. Furthermore direct supply contracts between 
exporting organizations and processing companies form an important part 
of the international marketing system of coffee. 
The cash market consists of spot markets and shipment markets. The 
spot market entails the trading of coffee that has actually arrived from 
producing countries and is being stored in warehouses. The shipment 
market involves the purchase or sale of actual coffee for shipment in a 
producing country. An importer can buy in three ways; cost and freight, 
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cost, insurance and freight, and free on board, delivery steamer at load-
ing port. During the voyage this coffee can change hands many times. 
The main spot and shipment markets are all located in the importing cen-
tres of New York, London, Bremen, Le Havre and Marseilles. 
The futures market provides the possibility for importers, exporters 
and traders to hedge the risk of future, adverse price movements. 
Standardized contracts for a certain quantity and quality (The New York 
'C'-contract) of coffee to be bought or sold at a fixed future date provide 
traders, seeking to avoid r isk, with an important opportunity of hedging 
this risk. As risk-hedging parties, who cover either risk on a future sale 
or future purchase, are not evenly matched, additional liquidity in the 
market is furnished by speculators. These assume uncovered r isk, with 
as goal, the making of a profit by predicting the direction in which the 
market will move. The futures market also offers an economically viable 
means for pre-harvest financing to exporters and to the marketing boards 
of producing countries. Most transactions on the futures market do not 
lead to delivery or acceptance of the physical coffee, as traders relieve 
themselves of the obligations by entering into offsetting transactions. As 
such, the futures market is used basically to avoid the risk of price 
fluctuations and/or to assume the risk of price fluctuations (speculation). 
Use of futures markets to hedge the price of future sales of coffee by 
exporting countries is generally viewed rare (Thomson; Thompson and 
Bond; Kuhn, 1985). A number of reasons can be found to explain this. 
The margin deposit required for exporters willing to hedge amounts to 
10-15% of the total value. As this involves scarce foreign exchange (US 
dollars/Pounds Sterl ing), and also the risk of further margin deposits at 
adverse price movements, some exporters cannot finance this transaction. 
Furthermore, cross-hedging is often necessary to hedge their own cur-
rency movements against the US dollar or the Pound Sterling. Also, if the 
quality, quantity or time of delivery do not correspond to the standard 
contract traded in New York or London the exporter incurs the so-called 
basic risk (Thompson and Bond, 1985; p. 980). 
Contracts of supply (or 'special deals') entail a mutual binding agree-
ment between major producing countries and large roasting firms in con-
suming countries. This practice, begun in 1967 (Singh, 1977; p. 39), has 
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increased rap id ly and now v i r t ua l l y all coffee from the Brazi l ian and 
Colombian state market ing author i t ies is sold under contract wi th roast-
ers . Prices, however, are usual ly connected to those on the markets 
mentioned above. Brazi l ian expor te rs , fo r example, of fer roast ing f i rms a 
re fund equal to the di f ference between the New York price fo r unwashed 
Arabicas (Santos 4) and a weighted average of indicator prices for other 
Milds and Robustas. Apar t f rom t h i s , a f ide l i t y bonus is paid to the 
roasters when they use a minimum amount of Brazi ls in the i r b lends. 
Special deals are entered into for var ious numbers of years . Colombian 
exporters apply a similar s t ra tegy . 
A special form of supply contracts are compensable t ransact ions, or 
bar ter t r ade . Here the payment of fore ign exchange is avoided. The oc-
currence of bar te r t rade was exacerbated by the f inancial cr is is of the 
early e ight ies. Bar ter t rade t ransact ions, invo lv ing Braz i l ian, Colombian, 
Costa Rican and Tanzanian coffee are mentioned by Avramovic (1986; p. 
973). 
T ranspor t of coffee is mainly by sh ip . Shipping rates fo r coffee, as fo r 
many other commodity expor ts from developing count r ies , are established 
by the var ious shipping car te ls , or conferences which dominate the 
t ranspor t market . In the past , shipment ta r i f f s amounted to 2-3% of the 
landed value of coffee in import ing countr ies (Unc tad , 1982; p. 49) . Most 
ships t ranspor t ing coffee are owned by interests in developed count r ies , 
though Brazi l ian and Colombian coffee author i t ies have established the i r 
own shipping l ines. For most smaller expor te rs , the quant i t ies of coffee 
do not j us t i f y the investment necessary to establish a domestically owned 
l ine. 
4.4 Part ic ipants on the internat ional coffee market 
Internat ional t rade in coffee is conducted by supp l ie rs , i .e . governmen-
tal agencies and/or pr ivate expor te rs , t raders and processing companies. 
Export sales in most coffee producing countr ies are handled by pr ivate 
expor t f i rms (Unc tad , 1982; p. 44) . Governmental agencies can compete 
wi th pr iva te expor ters ( e . g . El Salvador and Mexico) or can use them to 
39 
act as the i r brokers ( e . g . Ivory Coast) . Increasingly t hough , coffee 
market ing author i t ies are themselves tak ing a d i rec t role in expor t mar-
ke t ing . This is indicated by the increasing importance of supply contracts 
between coffee author i t ies and processing companies. Colombia's FNC for 
example sells d i rec t l y to buyers in Europe and Japan whereas most ex-
por ts are handled th rough about f o r t y expor t f i rms . In Brazi l the para-
statal IBC negotiates sales to state t rad ing companies in centra l ly planned 
economies and sells coffee from the storage faci l i t ies i t owns in T r ies te , 
Hamburg and Hong Kong. On other markets i t competes wi th pr ivate 
Brazi l ian companies such as Intercont inental de Café S . A . , the wor ld 's 
largest pr ivate coffee t rad ing f i r m , and BRACAFÉ. Braspetro and Cobec 
are government-owned t rad ing companies tha t also deal in a number of 
other p roduc ts . The actions of pr ivate expor ters in Brazi l are inf luenced 
to a ve ry large extent by IBC policy on expor t market ing . In countr ies 
wi th a monopoly si tuat ion for national coffee purchases, th is organizat ion 
in many cases acts as a single sel ler. 
For t r a d i n g , i t is estimated (Unc tad , 1982; p. 54) tha t 50% of all t rade 
is handled by predominantly large internat ional t rad ing houses, the rest 
being undertaken by transnat ional companies. Concentrat ion in in terna-
tional t rade has been a t t r ibu ted par t l y to the h igh prices prevai l ing in 
the mid-sevent ies, and the low volume of t r a d i n g , which led to a large 
number of mergers and takeovers . Large t radi t ional coffee t rad ing com-
panies are ACLI Internat ional ( U S A ) , Jack Aron ( U S A ) , Socomex (USA) 
and Volkar t (Swi tzer land) . 
Processing companies also play an important role. Concentrat ion in th is 
sector has led to powerful corporat ions such as General Foods, Sara Lee 
Corporat ion, Jacobs, Procter and Gamble, Standard Brands and the A ta l -
lagroup. These six corporat ions had a jo in t market share in the developed 
countr ies roasted coffee market of 32.8% in 1978, whereas in the develop-
ed countr ies ' instant coffee market , General Foods and Nestlé together 
control led 75% of all sales (Unc tad , 1982; p. 61-63). Chalmin (1980; p. 
537) concluded that wor ld coffee t rade is t rader dominated, as most of the 
t rade is handled by internat ional t rad ing companies. Th is conclusion 
seems jus t i f ied h is tor ica l ly , bu t the growing importance of producing 
countr ies ' market ing author i t ies has undoubtedly reduced the i r role in 
recent years . 
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4.5 Market character ist ics 
Basical ly, the internat ional coffee market is the confrontat ion between 
product ion and consumption character is t ics. In th is confrontat ion coffee 
prices are formed. I t has been argued in previous chapters tha t neither 
consumption nor product ion are real ly responsive to prices in the shor t 
te rm. Fur thermore, as has been shown, on a year ly basis product ion is 
volat i le because of weather inf luences. On the other hand response to 
pr ice changes in the long term is ra ther s t rong . When combined, these 
observations mean tha t coffee prices are inherent ly unstable. The moment 
at which and the rate in which th is ins tab i l i ty becomes manifest, however, 
depends on the conduct of market par t ic ipants . Market part ic ipants can 
fuel or dampen the inherent ins tab i l i t y . Here, stockholding and specu-
lation are of utmost importance,as are organized producers ' market i n te r -
vent ions. Generally speaking, stocks can be formed and held ei ther in 
producing countr ies or in consuming count r ies . Fur thermore, the stocks 
can be of a shor t term nature and of a long term nature . The latter is 
possible because, under specif ied condi t ions, the qua l i ty of the coffee can 
be maintained fo r several years . A t var ious occasions in the past , 
Figure 4 .2 . World and Brazi l 's net opening stocks, 1965-1985. 
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Figure 4 .3 . World expor t and stocks. 
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Brazi l has raised market prices by wi thhold ing product ion from the in te r -
national market . Smaller countr ies have often followed Brazil as a pr ice 
leader (Jungui to and Pizano, 1981; p. 9 ) . Since 1980 its stocks have 
formed a much smaller par t of total world producer stock, bu t th roughout 
the century i t has been the main producer stockholder, holding 80-90% of 
wor ld stocks (see Figure 4 .2 ) . As such Brazi l was able to exer t pressure 
to join expor t rest r ic t ion schemes on other producers by threatening to 
f lood the market . 
Figure 4.3 shows the development of wor ld stocks and expor ts . I t can 
be seen that a long term cycl ic movement existed in wor ld stocks, 
between the period 1953-1976. I t is important to note tha t stocks have 
been negat ively but s t r i c t l y correlated wi th prices (see S ingh , 1977 and 
Akiyama, 1982). The cycle star ted wi th h igh prices and low stocks in the 
early f i f t i es . These were followed by high stocks and low prices in the 
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early sixties, after which low stocks and extremely high prices closed the 
cycle in the mid-seventies. 
Given the steadily increasing consumption, the main cause of cycles in 
stocks and prices must be found in the production characteristics. Wea-
ther can induce production fluctuations whereas successive price changes 
may induce a high supply response in the long term. 
Stockholding for a monopolistic price policy at f i rs t may have been very 
attractive for Brazil, but in the long run , forming and holding stocks 
have several drawbacks. If prices are raised effectively these provide in-
centives for competitive producers. Furthermore, the costs of stockhold-
ing are high. Finally, if they are large, they have proven to be price 
depressing. The stock level has been shown to be of a conditional nature 
as to the price effect of crop failures. Both in 1953 and 1975/ 76 when 
frosts seriously reduced harvests, stocks were at extremely low levels, 
compared to annual exports. The market reacted in both situations with 
Table 4.2. Stocks in consuming countries, 1970-'81. 
End of Consumer 
year stocks in 
million bags 
70/71 7.5 
71/72 9.3 
72/73 8.0 
73/74 10.6 
74/75 
75/76 7.8 
76/77 7.1 
77/78 7.2 
78/79 5.4 
79/80 7.1 
80/81 7.8 
Source: Akiyama 1982 p. 9. 
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large upward price movements, aggravated by increased speculative in-
terest. Frosts or drought in years with a relatively higher stock level 
had in the short term a less pronounced effect on market prices. 
In the consuming countries, stockholding is performed by processing 
firms. Their strategy consists of spreading supplies from various sources 
and varying stock levels according to costs of storage and market expec-
tations. The prime concern of the processing industry is to secure the 
supply of the raw material. In times of uncertainty of future harvests, a 
natural reaction to scarcity is formed by an increase in demand also ag-
gravating price rises. Table 4.2 shows the development of stocks in con-
suming countries. 
Apart from exporters withholding production and importers changing 
stock levels, there is a th i rd group of market participants that influences 
price formations, the non-trade interest, which operates in the futures 
market. The influence of this interest on price formation is believed to be 
excessively large in some periods. There is however no consensus about 
what constitutes excessive speculation. 
According to the Bank of England, the supervisory authority on the 
futures market, speculation is excessive when non-trade interests account 
for more than 30% of the contracts outstanding in the futures market. The 
Bank is said to intervene by restrict ing, usually informally but on rare 
occasions formally, the number of new contracts that can be entered to 
(Commonwealth Secretariat 1980; p. 74). The Chigago Mercantile Exchange 
however has a different attitude and considers a minimum of 50% non-
trade interest (investors, speculators) necessary for the provision of 
sufficient liquidity (Kuhn, 1985; p. 997). 
During normal market conditions i.e. in the absence of alarming news 
concerning supply of coffee, speculators do provide additional liquidity to 
equate sellers and buyers positions following a hedging strategy. In such 
market conditions, speculation is an indispensable part of the trading sys-
tem and even enhances price stability (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1980). 
However, the growth of non-trade involvement in futures markets has not 
been welcomed by critics who argued that its flood of capital destabilizes 
and causes commodity prices to become increasingly separated from actual 
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supply and demand conditions. Speculative activity requires a degree of 
price instability to be viable. Alarming news can attract speculative in-
vestment capital seeking a yield on capital, and in recent years this trend 
has increased. For example, turnover on futures markets increased 
greatly during the seventies. After the free float of the dollar started in 
1973, turnover even exceeded world production, as was also the case 
after the frost in Brazil in 1976. This trend concerns especially capital 
from large institutional investors whose capital is extremely mobile, 
moving from market to market and depending on expected price move-
ments. 'Bandwagon effects' then easily develop. These effects are further 
supported by small private investors who have reportedly entered the 
market. The high speculative activity on the coffee market has been 
labelled the 'doctors and dentist' reaction (Financial Times, 20.5.1986). 
These reactions usually create a continuing price movement, either up-
wards or downwards, and surely form a destabilizing factor on the world 
market. 
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THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT 
5.1 In t roduct ion 
In the preceeding chapter i t was concluded tha t pr ice ins tab i l i ty is a 
basic feature of the internat ional coffee market . For many countr ies coffee 
is a ve ry important product fo r expor t revenues, and coffee pr ice 
f luctuat ions therefore have a considerable impact on the i r economy. For 
economic and polit ical reasons the major consuming countr ies decided in 
1962 to suppor t a coffee pr ice stabi l izat ion scheme, based on the f rame-
work agreed on in 1948 in the Charter of Havana. This became the f i r s t 
Internat ional Coffee Agreement ( I C A ) . By means of expor t quotas im-
posed on producing count r ies , wor ld market prices were to be stabil ized 
to increase the s tab i l i ty of expor t revenues of these economies. In the 
h is tory of in tervent ions in the coffee market Brazi l had already been 
apply ing a policy of monopolistic expor t p r ic ing since 1906 by reta in ing 
produce from the market . In 1941, expor t quotas, now on a mult i lateral 
Latin American basis, were imposed on expor ts to the US. Also in the 
decade preceeding the I CA of 1962, expor t quotas had been the i n s t r u -
ment of pr ice regulat ion. 
The Internat ional Coffee Agreement of 1962 was renewed in 1968, 1976 
and 1983. Al though an evolut ion in regulatory mechanism can be d i s t i n -
gu ished, the basic features remained unchanged. 
This chapter begins wi th a discussion on the cu r ren t features of ICA 
1983. Export quotas and the i r determinat ion, indicator pr ices, and o rgan i -
zational s t ruc tu re of the Internat ional Coffee Organization ( ICO) are des-
c r i bed . A t the same t ime, an ins ight is g iven into the evolut ion of the 
economic clauses of the preceeding Coffee Agreements, and a f u r t h e r 
analysis is made of previous internat ional ly coordinated intervent ions in 
the coffee market . For some of the problems ar is ing from these in te r -
vent ions, administrat ive or legislat ive solutions were found while others 
proved inherent to the system of expor t quotas. Then follows a descr ip -
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tion and analysis of the problems which ICA 1983 is currently facing. 
These problems are defined as such, since they have caused disputes 
among participating producing and consuming members. The chapter 
concludes with an assessment. 
5.2 The International Coffee Agreement of 1983 
Objectives 
The prime objective of ICA 1983 does not differ from that of earlier 
Coffee Agreements. It aims at achieving a reasonable balance between 
world supply and demand on a basis which will assure adequate supplies 
of coffee at fair prices to the consumers, and markets for coffee at re-
munerative prices to producers. According to Article 1 of ICA 1983, this 
will be conducive to long term equilibrium between production and con-
sumption. Furthermore, a number of secondary objectives have been add-
ed. 
1. To avoid excessive fluctuations in the levels of world supplies, stocks 
and prices which are harmful to both producers and consumers. 
2. To contribute to the development of productive resources and to the 
promotion and maintenance of employment and income in Member coun-
tr ies, thereby helping to bring about fair wages, higher living stand-
ards and better working conditions. 
3. To increase the purchasing power of coffee exporting countries by 
keeping prices in accordance with the prime objective and by increas-
ing consumption. 
4. To promote and increase the consumption of coffee by every possible 
means. 
5. In general, in recognition of the relation between the coffee trade and 
the economic stability of markets for industrial products, to further 
international cooperation in connection with world coffee problems. 
(Ar ts . 2-6 of ICA 1983). Unless otherwise stated, further articles refer-
red to in this section refer to ICA 1983. 
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It is clear from these objectives that the prime aim of the Agreement is 
to stabilize world market prices, and thus coffee export revenues for ex-
porting countries and coffee import payments for importing countries. 
Purchasing power for exporting countries is only to be increased by in-
creased consumption in importing countries (and not by increase in 
prices), thereby creating a larger market for industrial products for ex-
port from coffee importing countries. The interests of both exporting and 
importing countries are thus served by a stable world coffee market. 
These mutual interests form the basis of the Agreement. 
Export quotas 
The method of price stabilization is the imposition of restrictions on ex-
ports by exporting countries. Since almost all exporting countries (50) 
participate in the Agreement, 99% of world coffee exports in 1985 was 
covered by its provisions. The 25 importing member countries have 
agreed to restrict imports from non-member countries to the level of the 
period 1962/64. In 1985 this formed only 0.5% of total imports (ICO 
QSB, 36). In the same year, imports by non-member countries amounted 
to 12% of total world imports. Every year during the annual Council meet-
ing, where all exporting and importing members gather, a decision is 
made upon the size of the global annual quota of coffee to be exported. 
The following criteria are taken into account (Ar t . 34): 
1. The estimated annual consumption of importing members. 
2. The estimated changes in the level of inventories in member countries 
and free ports. 
3. Announced shortfalls in exports. 
This global annual quota is then formally allocated among exporting mem-
bers (A r t . 35) using a fixed distribution key, which was agreed upon in 
1976 and which was also included in the 1983 Agreement. Individual an-
nual quotas are apportioned to a fixed part, based on the historical 
(basic) quota of each member, and to a variable part, based upon each 
member's share in the verified stocks available for export in the member's 
warehouses. The basic export quota forms 70% of the total quota. The 
variable part forms 30% of the total quota, on condition that no member 
receives more than 40% of i t . Not all members are subject to this formal 
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determination of the individual quota size, as the Agreement discerns two 
types of exporting members. The 20 countries exporting less than 400.000 
bags are exempt from a basic quota and together have an export quota 
corresponding to 4.2% of the global annual quota. Exceptions are Burundi 
and Rwanda, which have a fixed export quota (Ar t . 31). Angola also has 
a similar position within the Agreement. 
In practice though, the formal determination of quotas on the basis of 
previous export quotas and stocks available for exports has never been 
applied. Instead, the distribution of quotas among exporting members has 
the character of an ad-hoc decision procedure (Dauster, 1986; p. 4) . 
The dynamics of the global quota are determined by the movements in 
the composite indicator price. When certain reference price boundaries are 
surpassed, quotas are automatically adjusted to take account of market 
conditions and to restore equilibrium. The composition and exact function-
ing of the indicator price are discussed further in the next section. 
In order to secure an orderly flow of coffee to the world market, ex-
porting members have to export 25% of their annual quota every quarter 
of the coffee year, which runs from the f i rs t of October until the th i r -
tieth of September (Ar t . 36). Members exporting less than 100.000 bags a 
year are exempted. 
When an exporting member anticipates a shortfall from its export en-
titlements, he has to declare this in order to permit proportional redis-
tribution in the same coffee year among other exporters who are able and 
prepared to export the amount of the shortfall (A r t . 40). 
Compliance with the quota provisions is controlled by means of cert i-
ficates of or igin. Each country receives export stamps to a quantity cor-
responding to its allotted annual quota. Each shipment of coffee has to be 
accompanied by a valid certificate of origin with an affixed stamp. Import-
ing countries must prohibit imports of coffee not accompanied by such a 
certificate. Import and export among importing members has to be com-
bined with a certificate of re-export. The purpose of this is to prevent 
non-member countries from re-exporting coffee which they originally im-
ported from member countries (Ar t . 43). This coffee is known as 
Tourist coffee. In the Agreement, importing countries thus act as a 
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Table 5.1 Composite Indicator Price (US dol larcents per pound equivalent) 
as at July 2nd , 1986. 
prices 
1 . Other Milds 
El Salvador CS 
Guatemala PW 
Mexico PW 
n . q . ex dock New York 
157.00 prices 
152.50 
+ 309.50/2 = 154.75 x 0.75** 
El Salvador HG 
Guatemala HB 
Nicaragua SHG 
169. 
171. 
168. 
.76 
.01 
.90 
ex dock Bremen/Hamburg 
+ 509.67/3 = 169.89 x 0.25** = 1 . 158.54 
2. Robusta 
Angola Ambriz 2BB n . q . 
Côte d ' Ivo i re G II 117.50 
Uganda Standard 118.00 
ex dock New York 
Côte d ' Ivo i re SG II 
Cameroon SG I 
Central Af r ican S 
Madagascar SG 11 
+ 235.50/2 
119.14 
119.98 
118.75 
116.28 
= 117.75 x 0 .6* * 
ex dock Le Ha 
474.15/4 118.54 x 0 .4* * = 2. 118.07 
\. 158.54 
2. 118.07 
+ 276.61/2 
138.31 Composite indicator pr ice (1979) 
* n . q . = not quoted 
* * = relat ive weight 
Source: Weekly repor t on pr ices, Thursday July 3 r d , 1986. ICO London 
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control post fo r the compliance wi th the quota provis ions of expor t ing 
members. 
The indicator pr ice 
The rest r ic t ions on expor ts by means of quotas for indiv idual countr ies 
aim at maintaining the coffee pr ice wi th in the agreed range of 1.20 dol lar 
and 1.40 dollar per pound. As has already been made clear, coffee is not 
a homogeneous p roduc t , bu t has a wide range of qual i t ies and t ypes . On 
the wor ld market , year ly average expor t prices fo r d i f fe ren t quali t ies 
var ied in 1985 f rom 363 dol larcents per pound fo r Jamaican coffee (a 
premium pr iced connoisseurs coffee) to 97 dol larcents per pound for l i t t le 
p re fe r red Robusta coffee from Gabon. 
The Internat ional Coffee Organization discerns fou r main t ypes . 
1 . Colombian Milds (washed Arab ica) . 
2. Other Milds (washed Arab ica ) . 
3. Brazi l ian and other Arabicas (unwashed Arab ica ) . 
4. Robustas. 
These are l isted here in a (under normal market condi t ions) decl ining 
pr ice sequence. 
Al l countr ies are classif ied into one of these categories, al though some 
countr ies expor t both Arabica and Robusta. 
In order to obtain an indicator pr ice which is representat ive for the 
wor ld coffee market , a composite indicator pr ice has been designed, i n -
c lud ing only specif ic coffee qual i t ies from the Other Milds and the Robus-
ta category (see Table 5 .1 ) . Brazi l ian and other Arabicas and Colombian 
Milds are not inc luded, as in the view of import ing members, quotations 
fo r Brazi l ian and Colombian coffees, are administered by the coffee 
author i t ies in both countr ies (Jungui to and Pizano, 1981; p. 8 ) . The 
large inf luence the i r quotat ions would have on the composite indicator 
pr ice would enable the i r coffee author i t ies to manipulate the performance 
of the Agreement. The 1962/68 Agreements d id contain Brazi l ian and Co-
lombian Milds in the pr ice ind icators . The cu r ren t indicator is composed 
of the coffee types mentioned and quotat ions are obtained in both the New 
York Commodity exchange and the European spot markets of Bremen and 
Le Havre. 
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Figure 5 . 1 . The composite indicator pr ice and indicator prices fo r 
Other Mild Arabicas and Robusta, 1983-1986. 
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The composite indicator pr ice (CIP) is publ ished dai ly by the ICO. Its 
15-day moving average determines the quota system. When i t 
moves out of the stabi l izat ion range of 1.20-1.40 US dol lars /per pound , 
quotas are automatically enlarged or decreased by f i xed percentages r e -
lative to the agreed reference pr ices. When the 15-day moving average 
CIP exceeds the 1.40 dollar per pound, an ext ra 1 million bags are added 
to the global annual quota and d is t r ibu ted propor t ional ly among expor t -
ing members. An identical quant i t y is supplemented at 1.45 dol lar , where-
as at 1.50 dollar an ext ra 3 million bags are d i s t r i b u t e d . When these quo-
ta enlargements do not resul t in a decline in p r i ce , and the moving 
average remains fo r 45 days consecutively above the 1.50 dol lar level , 
quotas are suspended. Export ing members then are obliged to expor t as 
much as they can in order to b r i ng prices down, dependent on the i r 
logistic capacity and avai labi l i ty of stocks ( A r t . 33) . 
When the indicator pr ice remains 15 consecutive days under the level of 
1.34, quotas are then re in t roduced. 
In the case of a pr ice f a l l , quotas are decreased by 1 million bags at 
the pr ice level of both 1.20 and 1.15 dol lar . A t a lower pr ice level , the 
Council is convened to discuss measures. The quota adaptations are 
automatic, unless the Council decides otherwise. Figure 5.1 shows the 
development of the CIP in recent years . 
Organizational s t ruc tu re 
The Internat ional Coffee Organization ( ICO) in London, established u n -
der the 1962 Agreement, administers the provis ions of the Agreement and 
supervises the operation of the Agreement ( A r t . 8 ) . Fur thermore, i t 
funct ions as the meeting point for sessions of the Coffee Author i t ies , the 
Coffee Council and the Coffee Board , which form the regulatory and 
execut ive bodies of the Agreement (F igure 5 .2 ) . The highest au thor i t y of 
the organizat ion is the Internat ional Coffee Counci l , which consists of all 
the members of the Organizat ion. Each member has one representat ive on 
the Counci l , ent i t led to cast the votes al lotted to the member. The 
Council has the power to ca r r y out the provis ions of the Agreement. 
Rules and regulat ions are established when a t w o - t h i r d d is t r ibu ted 
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Figure 5.2. Organization scheme of the ICO. 
Chairman: a l ternat ing 
f rom producers /con-
sumers 
Producing i 
Members 1 Coffee 
(50) ' Council 
1000 votes* 
Coffee Board 
8 producers 
8 consumers 
Consuming 
Members 
(25) 
1000 votes* 
Executive d i rec tor 
ICO 
Administ rat ion of 
Agreement 
(London) 
* The distribution of the votes is given in Table 5.2. 
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majority is reached. All other decisions require a simple distributed 
majority. Votes have been distributed equally among producers and con-
sumers. Both groups have 1000 votes which are allotted to member 
countries according to the size of export quotas and the import volume. 
No member may hold more than 400 votes. Each exporting member has 
four basic votes, whereas each importing member has five basic votes. 
The remaining votes are divided among exporting members in proportion 
to the average volume of their respective exports of coffee to importing 
members in the preceeding four calendar years (see Table 5.2). 
The number of votes is decisive for the member's contribution to the 
budget of the Organization. Both exporting and importing countries 
finance the Organization's operations. Ar t . 15 states that if only one 
country vetoes a proposal in the Council, then the proposal is still con-
sidered to have been adopted. Because of the composition of the votes in 
the Coffee Council as at June 27th 1986, not one country is able to veto a 
decision. Under the 1968 Agreement, the US had 400 votes. Its relatively 
declining imports have since then eroded the number of votes to the 
current 268. 
The Coffee Council is convened at least twice a year, but sessions are 
also held at the request of the Executive Board or in cases of emergency. 
The Executive Board is responsible to, and works under, the general 
direction of the Council. It consists of eight exporting and eight import-
ing member representatives, who are elected every year among importing 
and exporting members' candidates respectively. The representatives ob-
tain the number of votes cast for them when they were elected, but this 
must not exceed 499 votes (Ar t . 17). The minimum number of votes 
amounts to 75. The work of the Board consists of tasks which have been 
delegated to it by the Council. 
The Executive Director of the ICO is responsible for the performance of 
any duties devolved upon him in the Administration of the Agreement. He 
is appointed by the Council. Since 1968 this office has been held by the 
Brazilian A.F . Beltrâo, the former president of the Brazilian Coffee Insti-
tute ( IBC). The Organization acts as a centre for the collection, ex-
change and publication of statistical information on world production, 
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Table 5 .2 . Dis t r ibut ion of votes in the Coffee Council 
Expor t i ng 1 Impor t ing 2 
Total 1.000 1.000 
Angola 9 
Austra l ia - 15 
Aust r ia - 20 
Belgium/Luxembourg - 32 
Bolivia 6 
Brazi l 252 
Burund i 11 
Canada - 32 
Colombia 142 
Costa Rica 23 
Cuba 6 
Cyprus - 6 
Denmark - 20 
Dominican Republic2 
Ecuador 21 
El Salvador 40 
Equatorial Guinea2 
Ethiopia 25 
Fiji - 5 
Finland - 20 
France - 87 
Germany F.R. of - 134 
Ghana 4 
Greece - 11 
Guatemala 34 
Guinea2 
Haït i 2 
Honduras 18 
India 16 
Indonesia 45 
Ireland - 6 
I taly - 62 
Jamaica 4 
Japan - 58 
Kenya 25 
Liberia 6 
Malawi 4 
Mexico 35 
Netherlands - 43 
New Zealand - 7 
Nicaragua 14 
Niger ia2 
Norway - 15 
(cont inued on next page) 
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Table 5.2. Distribution of votes in the Coffee Council (continued) 
Total 
OAMCAF 
OAMCAF 
Benin 
Cameroon 
Central Af r ican Republic 
Congo 
Cote d ' Ivo i re 
Gabon 
Madagascar 
Togo 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 2 
Phil ippines 
Portugal 
Rwanda 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sweden 
Switzer land 
Tanzania 
Thai land 
Tr in idad and Tobago2 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
USA 
Venezuela 
Yugoslavia 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Expo r t i ng 1 
1.000 
104 
(4) 
(0 ) 
(23) 
(4) 
(0) 
(56) 
(0) 
(12) 
(5 ) 
4 
14 
6 
-
11 
-
11 
8 
-
-
4 
-
-
16 
6 
-
42 
-
-
4 
-
22 
4 
4 
Impor t ing 2 
1.000 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
9 
-
-
16 
31 
-
29 
20 
-
-
-
-
42 
268 
-
12 
-
-
-
1
 Four basic votes allotted to each exporting member and five basic 
votes to each importing member under the provisions of paragraph (2) 
of Article 13 of the Agreement. 
2
 Voting rights suspended. 
Source: ICO, EB 437/86. 
prices, exports and imports, distribution and consumption of coffee. The 
Council may require individual members to furnish information on coffee 
production, production trends, exports and imports, distr ibution, con-
sumption, stocks, prices and taxation. 
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Furthermore, the Organization has assigned a Swiss expertise agent, 
SGS of Geneva, to undertake annually the verification of stocks in pro-
ducing countries. Only recently have representatives from producing 
countries accompanied these missions to secure a proper inventarisation of 
the amount and quality of coffee stored in warehouses. In trade circles, 
previous verifications had given rise to doubts. This information, to-
gether with data on domestic consumption and the official exports to 
member and non-member countries, serves as a base to calculate produc-
tion in each member country. 
In order to comply with the objective "promote and increase of the con-
sumption of coffee consumption by every possible means" (Ar t . 5) , the 
Promotion Fund has been established. This Fund is administered and 
financed by exporting countries. It undertakes promotion campaigns in 
consuming countries in cooperation with the appropriate parties in the im-
porting countries concerned. Furthermore, it engages in coffee-drinking 
studies in consuming countries. 
A Special Fund has been created to finance additional measures to im-
plement provisions of the Agreement relevant to its operation, in particu-
lar the verification of stocks in producing countries. It is financed by le-
vies on exports to importing members. 
5.3. History of international market interventions 
From the beginning of this century various attempts have been made to 
influence and regulate the prices on the international coffee market. Bra-
zil was the f i rs t to restrict its exports to the world market in order to 
sustain prices. This was initially organized by the State of Sao Paolo. In 
1921 the Federal Government intervened and accumulated large stocks 
(Gordon-Ashworth, 1984; p. 208). 
Controls in the international coffee market up to 1940 were thus a sin-
gle-handed Brazilian action. From 1931 to 1944 Brazil destroyed 78 million 
bags of stored coffee (Furtado, 1976; p. 185). This amount was equi-
valent to three and a half years of Brazilian production in 1938/39 
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(Rowe, 1963; p. 21) . Brazi l 's policy was to prove too costly to bear 
alone. Between 1931 and 1937 i t made repeated ef for ts to induce other 
Latin American exporters to agree to an internat ional expor t rest r ic t ion 
scheme, but no-one cooperated (Gordon, 1984; p. 209). The essence of 
an expor t rest r ic t ion scheme, the l imitation of expor t s , d id not sui t p ro -
duct ion developments in Colombia and the Central American countr ies. Be-
tween 1920 and 1930 the area under coffee and expor ts of coffee in 
Colombia had t r i p l e d , par t l y because of the Brazi l ian 'valorizacion'-scheme 
(De Graaff , 1986; p. 134). Also Af r ican Robusta product ion was increas-
ing rap id l y . 
In 1937, the last of the conferences to discuss mult i lateral control of 
supply broke down. Brazi l decided to cu t its losses and to regain i ts 
former market share. Between 1937 and 1939 i ts exports rose from 12.1 
million bags to 17.1 million bags, or 63% of wor ld exports (Gordon, 1984; 
p. 210). 
Inter-American Coffee Agreement 
The outbreak of the Second World War in Europe shut of f the European 
market , second only in importance to the US which had 40% of wor ld im-
por ts . Prices dropped to even lower levels than prevai l ing du r ing the 
depression of the th i r t ies (Payer , 1975; p. 159). Fur thermore, the lack of 
ships for t ranspor t to the US caused an increase in wor ld coffee stocks 
and a f u r t h e r dest ruct ion of excess supply in B raz i l . The outbreak of the 
war though did b r ing a wil l ingness on the par t of the producers of Mild 
coffees, increasingly cut of f f rom the i r European markets, to engage in a 
dialogue on an internat ional coffee market ing pol icy. Consequent ly, at the 
in i t ia t ive of the US and in a move limited to the American cont inents, the 
Inter-American Coffee Agreement ( IACA) was negotiated in 1940 (Gordon 
1984; p. 210). To sustain market prices i t entailed the l imitation of ex-
ports to the United States and Canada. Payer explains the United States's 
interest in th is agreement to ar is ing out of the f l i r t a t ion of var ious Latin 
American countr ies wi th the Axis powers (Payer , 1975; p. 159). The US 
government decided that commodity pr ice suppor t was an essential par t of 
an economic package to keep these countr ies in the American camp. A t 
that t ime, Braz i l , Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador and Costa Rica were 
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dependent on coffee exports fo r over 50% of the i r total expor t revenues. 
Fourteen Latin American countr ies signed the IACA, d i s t r i bu t i ng import 
quotas among these countr ies. The pr ice f ixed in 1941 was double tha t 
which had prevai led in the 1930's, at 13.4 dol larcent per pound , af ter 
in i t ia l ly increasing demand from American roasters had even put upward 
pressure on prices (Krasner , 1973; p. 502-503). Th is pr ice level though 
was too low to cover product ion costs as du r ing the war the general 
pr ice level had been r is ing and product ion accordingly fa l l ing steeply. 
Towards the end of the war , quotas were set so l iberal ly that the i r effect 
was drast ica l ly diminished (Akiyama, 1982; p. 33) . Coffee trees were 
uprooted and the land used fo r food crops and other more prof i table 
commodities (Payer , 1975; p. 159). In 1946, when the War was over , 
Brazi l ian coffee product ion was only 60% of the level reached at the be-
g inn ing of the t h i r t i e s . 
Dur ing the War, Af r ican product ion t reb led (Gordon, 1984; p. 210). 
Immediately af ter the sur render of the German t roops , the European 
market became accessible fo r coffee imports. Because of the severe 
balance of payment problems European countr ies were fac ing , coffee im-
por ts from dollar based Latin American countr ies were made subject to a 
tax of 9.6% ad valorem. Imports from the Afr ican colonies were exempted 
from import dut ies and the i r market share increased rap id ly . The scarci ty 
of coffee on the wor ld market sent prices u p . From an annual average of 
twenty cents per pound in 1946, they rose to 50.4 in 1950 (Gordon, 
p. 210). Hickmann earmarks th is period of high prices as the basis fo r 
chronic oversupply in the late f i f t ies and ear ly sixt ies (Hickmann, 1980; 
p. 53) . In the ear ly f i f t ies prices continued to rise as Brazi l 's stocks 
were at low levels and demand in Europe and the US rose wi th an i n -
crease in per capita income. 
A severe f ros t in Brazi l in 1953 and the outbreak of the Korean war in 
1953 cont r ibuted to an intensi f icat ion of pr ice increases. Lawrence and 
Cooper state tha t insecur i ty at the internat ional polit ical or monetary level 
often leads to a f l i gh t in tangible commodities (Lawrence and Cooper, 
1975; p. 685). According to Gray a number of Brazi l ian t raders began to 
buy up fu tu res contracts on the NYCE to f u r t h e r d r i ve up prices (Gray , 
1960; p. 310; Geer 1971, p. 155) Dur ing the f i f t ies Af r ican exports of 
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Robusta coffee benef i t ted from the growth in the instant coffee i n d u s t r y . 
The low cost Robusta coffee proved a serious competitor to the also low 
pr iced but st i l l more expensive Brazi l ian Arabicas. Robusta was also 
pre fe r red fo r i ts h igher y ie ld of instant coffee per kilogram coffee beans. 
Instant coffee had become increasingly popular in Europe where i t was 
introduced af ter the war by Nestlé (De Graaff , p.61) . The Af r ican expor t 
market share rose from 14,4% in 1947 to 23.2% in 1956 (Pan American 
Coffee Bureau, 1965). 
Latin American Coffee Agreement 
By 1954 coffee coun t ry author i t ies were already aware tha t a chronic 
global oversupply si tuat ion was on i ts way, though prices were st i l l h i g h . 
In tha t year at a meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
the proposal was launched to come to an Internat ional Coffee Agreement 
wi th the part ic ipat ion of producers and consumers. Commodity Agreements 
had already been instal led fo r Tea (1948), Wheat (1949), Sugar and T in 
(1954) according to the pr incip les laid down in the char ter of Havana in 
1947 (see Chapter 1 ) . The resul t of th is OAS meeting was tha t a special 
Coffee Committee wi th representat ives f rom the US, B raz i l , Colombia and 
Nicaragua engaged in a detailed economic research of the wor ld coffee 
economy. In 1956 a def in i t ive proposal fo r a f u l l y f ledged agreement was 
put fo rward to the OAS, bu t then the US (responsible for 60% of wor ld 
imports) declared i t would not par t ic ipate , as an expor t rest r ic t ion scheme 
would hamper the performance of the f ree market (F isher , 1972; p. 89) . 
In 1957, when pr ices were s l id ing downwards, seven Latin American coun-
t r ies decided to sign an agreement l imit ing expor ts th rough quota al lot-
ments fo r the coffee year of 1957/58. This agreement is known as the 
Mexico C i ty Agreement. I t was not ve r y succesful in prevent ing f u r t h e r 
decline in pr ices, which cont inued to s l ide. In 1958 the Mexico Ci ty 
Agreement was reviewed and renamed the Latin American Coffee Agree-
ment ( L A C A ) , under which the f i f teen largest South American coffee 
producers were regrouped. France and Por tugal , as representat ives fo r 
the i r Af r ican colonies, promised suppor t f o r the LACA. The US govern -
ment, in the words of president Eisenhower, regarded th is form of market 
regulat ion as a 's in against f ree enterpr ise ' (c i ted in Fisher, 1972; 
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p. 50) . The Secretary of State, John Förster Dul les, declared in the same 
year tha t the US realized the potential consequences of s t rong f luc tua-
t ions in the expor t révenues of Latin American countr ies and tha t a form 
of internat ional cooperation was needed (F isher , p. 27) . Th is realization 
though was not enough for par t ic ipa t ion . Payer, Krassner and Fisher 
agree on the important role played by the National Coffee Associat ion, in 
which the American coffee i ndus t r y was organized, in the preparat ion of 
US part ic ipat ion in the ICA of 1962 which was to fo l low, bu t d i f fe r in the 
analysis of the motives of the NCA (Payer , p. 160; Krasner , p. 507-510; 
Fisher, p. 22) . I t became clear tha t the NCA wanted to secure f u t u r e 
supplies of coffee as an element of the American way of l i fe and business, 
and tha t coffee producing economies should thus be supported (US Senate 
1963; p. 9 1 , cited in Payer, 1975; p. 160). Krasner underl ines the NCA's 
s t ra tegy to prevent too sharp a break in prices as to defend the i r own 
interests (Krasner , 1973; p. 510). 
According to Krasner the NCA lobby took the lead in sell ing the idea of 
an ICA to i ts members, as well as to Congress. Fur thermore, the coffee 
i ndus t r y was ve ry important , and US coffee imports valued at over 10% of 
total imports. The State Department had become alarmed by reports by US 
intel l igence, which f requen t l y warned of the potential dangers of the 
spread of Castroism in Latin America (F isher , p. 28) . 
When the LACA was extended in 1959, the US st i l l d id not join the 
Agreement. France and Por tugal , represent ing the i r colonies, now fo r -
mally entered i t , as d id Cameroon and Togo. The LACA did not funct ion 
ve ry we l l , as formal control of compliance wi th the quota provisions was 
not arranged f o r , and f raud f requen t l y occurred (F isher , p. 57) . 
Af r ican part ic ipat ion in the LACA of 1959/60, as represented by the i r 
mother countr ies (France and Por tuga l ) , became a fact when Robusta 
prices cont inued to f a l l , whereas, at the same t ime, exports of Arabica 
were fe tch ing a more stable, though s l igh t ly decl ining pr ice . Fur the r -
more, Brazi l 's th reat to put i ts stocks on the market may have been an 
impetus to Af r ican part ic ipat ion in an expor t rest r ic t ion scheme. Rowe 
remarks tha t though th is was a serious poss ib i l i t y , ' the Afr icans fai led to 
realize t ha t , in i ts own interest Brazi l nei ther would , nor real ly cou ld , do 
any th ing drast ic and at the most might snipe them in par t icu lar markets. 
62 
They probably feared the US displeasure and the possibi l i ty of import 
rest r ic t ions in the interests of the Pan-American polit ical so l idar i ty . But 
they were mainly inf luenced by the i r desire to ensure prices at a level 
which would pu t money in the pockets of the i r farmers and produce re -
lat ively sat isfactory fore ign exchange earn ings, jus t at the moment when 
so many of the countr ies involved had become, or were on the verge of 
becoming independent. The cost of jo in ing the agreement in 1959 seemed 
small, and most Af r ican producers joined in October 1959' (Rowe, 1963; 
p. 182). 
In 1960 the In te r -A f r i can Coffee Organization ( IACO) was created in 
order to defend common Af r ican interests in the negotiations on in terna-
tional cooperat ion. As a subgroup , i t comprised the OAMCAF (Organisa-
t ion Afr ica ine et Malagassy du Café) which represented the francophone 
former French colonies. Th is organizat ion later joined the ICA 1962 as a 
g roup . lACO's objectives were the common s tudy of the problems facing 
Af r ican coffees, par t i cu la r ly by the i r p roduc t ion , processing and market-
i n g , to ensure the smooth disposal of the product ion and the optimum 
level of pr ices. Its second object ive was the s tudy of the consumption of 
Af r ican coffees, and of the pub l ic i ty needed to increase demand. To th is 
end the Organizat ion collaborated wi th national and internat ional o rga-
nizations (Marchées Tropicaux et Mediterannées, March 1980). 
The Central American, Mexican and Caribbean countr ies had in 1945 a l -
ready organized themselves into the FEDECAME, comprising 14 member 
states. Th is central organizat ion though was rather weak, and was f r e -
quent ly bypassed in internat ional negotiations by i ts members (F isher , 
1975; p. 55) . Brazi l and Colombia were not organized into a central o r -
ganizat ion, bu t were ind iv idua l ly represented by the i r parastatal o rgan i -
zat ions, the IBC and the FNC. 
The 1960/61 Agreement was an extension of the 1959/60 LACA, and st i l l 
funct ioned wi thout the par t ic ipat ion of consuming countr ies. Its problems 
consisted especially in the control on the compliance wi th quota p r o v i -
sions. The need fo r control by consuming countr ies became ve ry clear. 
The f i r s t Internat ional Coffee Agreement: ICA 1962 
The impetus fo r US part ic ipat ion in a f u l l y f ledged Commodity Agree-
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ment was provided by the Cuban Missile cr is is in 1961. Many scholars be-
lieve tha t the loss of US control over Cuba induced Kennedy to agree to 
US part ic ipat ion in 1961. 'The United States is ready to cooperate in 
serious case by case examination of commodity market problems. Frequent 
v iolent changes in commodity prices seriously in jure the economies of 
many Latin American count r ies , dra in ing the i r resources and s tu l t i f y ing 
the i r g rowth ' (c i ted in Fisher, p. 63; Speech before Congress) . Since 
1898 the US had economically control led Cuba, the wor ld 's largest sugar 
expor ter at tha t t ime, by means of i ts sugar imports. When Fidel Castro 
took over and nationalized US proper ty on Cuba, the US tu rned down 
Cuban requests fo r loans, and prohib i ted i ts sugar imports. In 1960 
Castro agreed to exchange sugar fo r oil and machines from the Soviet 
Union. With the fa i lure of the Bay of Pigs invasions by US t ra ined Cuban 
refugees, Cuba was lost to US con t ro l . A commodity thus proved an im-
por tant means of contro l l ing and stabi l iz ing an economy and i t was th is 
real izat ion, as well as the previously described NCA in teres ts , which 
caused US to join the Coffee Study Group. This g roup , comprising 
members from producing and consuming count r ies , prepared a d ra f t which 
was to serve as the basis fo r the negotiations over the f i r s t long term 
ICA. Under the auspicies of the UN, the UN coffee conference was con-
vened in New York on July 9th of 1962. The f i r s t Internat ional Coffee 
Agreement was signed in September 1963. 
Whereas Brazi l and Colombia, w i th 49.6% of world expor ts , argued for 
h is tor ical ly-determined quotas, the Afr ican countr ies demanded selective 
adaptation of quotas determined by specif ic indicator pr ice ranges per 
t ype of coffee. The i r market share had grown to 27.9% and they reckoned 
wi th a growing demand from the expanding soluble coffee i n d u s t r y . Other 
Mild producers also pleaded for quotas based on demand. Brazi l and 
Colombia however, wanted to protect the i r market shares and wanted to 
ef fect ively l imit the r ise of exports from both low cost Robusta countr ies 
and the Central American producers . They wanted pro rata quota al lot-
ment ( K a h n , 1978; p. 182). The part ic ipat ion of the major consuming 
countr ies d id persuade the Afr ican countr ies to j o in , though the i r de-
mands were not met. In 1962 no special provis ion was made fo r the 
selective adaptation of pr ices. The ICA objective was stated as being to 
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prevent prices from falling below the level prevailing in 1962. No pro-
visions were made for the adaption of a threshold (Gordon, 1984; p. 214). 
Another point of issue was the preferential treatment ACP countries re-
ceived on import taxes in the EC. In the ICA 1962 only a general state-
ment referring to the removal of obstacles to consumption was adopted. 
The final quota distribution among the 36 contracting parties in ICA 
1962 was based on three elements. 
1 . The average exportable production of the previous four years. 
2. The application of a reduction, the larger a countries' market share. 
3. An adaptation for countries with special problems. 
The twenty-two importing countries were to limit their imports from 
non-member producers to the level of the 1960-1962 average. The sta-
tistics on which this quota distribution was based were provided by the 
USDA, but in ICA 1962 provisions were made for its own system of 
statistical information. Exports subject to quotas had to have a certificate 
of or igin, which was to be sent to the administrative office, the ICO in 
London. 
A major loophole in the agreement was that member exporters were 
allowed to ship coffee in amounts exceeding their quota to a number of 
countries which were not large importers of coffee and which had a low 
per capita consumption. The intention of the Agreement was to increase 
consumption of coffee in these areas, and at prices which were lower than 
those prevailing in the ICA regulated market (Payer, 1975; p. 162). 
Thirty-three countries, among them the Soviet bloc and Japan, belonged 
to these new markets. Because of the price differentials coffee exported 
to these markets was often immediately re-exported to Western Europe or 
the US. This kind of operation earned the name Tourist coffee. Fisher 
mentions Liberia, Marocco and Aruba as apparently large exporters of 
coffee, although in Marocco and Aruba coffee is not grown (Fisher, 1972; 
p. 86). These countries were used as trans-shipment points and formed a 
loophole in the regulation of the market. 
Because of frequent forgery, in 1965/66 the certificates of origin were 
replaced by official ICO stamps and posted to each participant in ratio to 
its quota. Custom officials in importing member countries were instructed 
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not to accept imports wi thout the off icial stamp. In exchange fo r th is 
f i rmer control on expor t s , which Brazi l and Colombia demanded, the 
Af r ican and Central American countr ies were favoured by a more f lex ib le 
quota d i s t r i b u t i o n , which they had asked fo r in 1962. Based on 15-day 
pr ice indications fo r the four main categories, the expor t quotas could be 
adjusted per category i f the pr ice range was exceeded. 
In October 1966, fou r ranges were agreed upon (Table 5 .3 ) . 
Table 5 .3 . Price range per category under the 1962 Agreement. 
Colombian Milds 43.50 - 47.50 $-c ts . per l b . 
Unwashed Arabica 37.50 - 41.50 $-c ts . per l b . 
Robustas 30.50 - 34.50 $-c ts . per l b . 
Other Milds 40.50 - 44.50 $-c ts . per l b . 
Source: Dr iehu is , 1976; p. 92. 
Prices were to be obtained from quotations fo r specif ied types on the 
New York market . When these prices were undercut or exceeded on 15 
consecutive market days, the expor t quotas were to be adjusted. From 
1966, an annual ver i f icat ion of stocks by an independent expert ise agen-
c y , SGS of Geneva was introduced in order to obtain an assessment of 
the real si tuat ion of supp ly . Since 1963 prices had been r i s i ng , because 
of the pol icy of expor t res t r ic t ion and a f ros t in Brazi l in 1963. Main-
tenance of these prices had been at the expense of considerable stock 
accumulation, mainly undertaken by Braz i l . Prices though had been 
sl id ing downwards consecut ively. In 1966, Colombia, joined by a number 
of important producing count r ies , attempted to counter th is t rend by o r -
ganized intervent ions on the New York market . When Brazi l joined th is 
group late in 1967 (compris ing Colombia, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Uganda, 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Mexico), the Geneva Agreement was s igned, 
which f u r t h e r rest r ic ted expor ts to prevent a f u r t h e r pr ice fal l (H ick -
mann, p. 58). This uni lateral producer action led to the d is integrat ion of 
ICA 1962, al though i t d id stop a f u r t h e r pr ice f a l l . In Brazi l a huge era-
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dication programme was undertaken, destroying 40% of the entire tree po-
pulation between 1962-1967. This considerably reduced output, and stocks 
were run down from 1966 until 1975 (see Figure 4.3). ICA 1962 had man-
aged to meet its objective of maintaining prices above the level of that 
prevailing in 1962 and had secured relatively stable prices, but this had 
been at the cost of an enormous stock withdrawal by Brazil. The export 
certificate system had proved inadequate in policing export volumes be-
cause of frequent infringements and the inadequate powers of the Council 
to enforce it (Gordon, 1984; p. 214). 
ICA 1968 
The negotiations for the renewal of ICA 1962 began in 1967, but were 
interrupted by the soluble coffee conflict between Brazil and the US (see 
Chapter 3). This postponed the final signing until 1970. The ICA 1968 
closely resembled ICA 1962 and was signed by 41 producing and 21 im-
porting countries. At the same time the Diversification Fund was also 
established. This was designed to limit coffee production, so to bringing 
supply back into reasonable balance with demand. Contributions to the 
Fund were obligatory for exporters with quotas of over 100,000 bags, and 
were in proportion to exports above that level. 
The 1968 production policy provisions were quite specific and carried 
with them a certain degree of accountability (Kahn, 1978; p. 186). Non-
fulfilment of the obligation to define production goals in line with domestic 
consumption, stock requirements and permitted exports brought about 
economic disadvantages. Members who did not comply with regulations 
would not enjoy annual quota increases, could have their voting rights 
suspended, and could even be forced to withdraw from the organization 
(Ar t . 48, ICA 1968). Diversification worked well in many countries and 
production was brought more or less into line with consumption (Beltrâo 
1986; p. 4). It was especially the US that had pressed for the inclusion 
of the Diversification Fund, to lessen the dependence on coffee of export-
ing countries. ICA 1968 stated that prices were not to fall below the 1962 
level as a general rule and contained price ranges for the four main 
coffee types (Ar t . 27). This selective adaptation of quotas meant that 
those for the principal types of coffee were not to be reduced by more 
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than f ive percent i f the indicator pr ice fel l t h rough the agreed low re fer -
ence pr ice ( A r t . 37, ICA 1968). ICA 1968 charged the Council to stimulate 
demand in countr ies wi th low per capita consumption, where to exports 
were not subject to quotas. The Council was to undertake promotion plans 
fo r expor ts to these countr ies and to control what members exported 
the re . An expor t quant i t y goal was set ( A r t . 40, ICA 1968). T igh te r 
controls were necessary to l imit the problem of Tour is t coffee. Bags had 
to te be marked wi th the words 'New Markets ' , and expor t ing members 
were made responsible fo r the f inal dest inat ion of the i r expor ts . Re-
expor t took place, the amount was deducted from the annual quota. 
The ICA 1968 ran into serious d i f f icu l t ies in 1972. The previous year 
the agreement of Bret ton Woods had broken down and the dol lar , the un i t 
of denomination for coffee pr ices, began to depreciate against the other 
major cur renc ies. In order to maintain the real purchasing power of the 
coffee do l lar , expor t ing countr ies demanded an $ 0.04/ lb upward revision 
of the pr ice range. Though the European countr ies of fered 0.02 do l la r / lb 
the US refused to consider any adjustment (Payer , 1975; p. 165). 
Fur thermore, the US was resent fu l , because in the late sixt ies and 
ear ly seventies Brazi l and a number of major producers had not exported 
the i r al lotted quota in f u l l . They had thus not complied wi th the Agree-
ment's prov is ions. Th is undershipment of quotas was a thorn in the side 
of the US, which was not wi l l ing to suppor t a producers ' car te l . A lso, 
the disagreement between the ' t rad i t iona l ' Latin American producers and 
the newer Af r ican expor ters over the allocation of expor t quotas in the 
context of a period in which prices were r i s i n g , led to the suspension of 
the economic provis ions of the ICA in December 1972 (G i lbe r t , 1986; 
p. 27) . The organizat ion was only kept al ive as a source of stat ist ics and 
as a meeting place, bu t controls were abandoned, ver i f icat ion of stocks 
d iscont inued, promotion scrapped and product ion pol icy was set aside 
(Be l t râo , 1986; p. 4 ) . Coffee prices on the internat ional markets, how-
ever , rose up parallel to pr ice movements of other commodities. 
A series of meetings by producer nations took place in an e f fo r t to 
continue market suppor t on the i r own. I t was agreed by the Geneva 
Agreement tha t all 21 producing nations would wi thhold 10% of the i r 
harvest from the market in 1973 (Payer , 1975; p. 167). The Geneva 
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Group undershipped its quotas and used consumer countr ies ' stat ist ical 
information and controls convened under ICO to undertake a producers ' 
s t ra tegy (Jungui to and Pizano, 1981; p. 6 ) . These twenty-one countr ies 
covered 90% of wor ld expor ts (Gordon, 1984; p. 215). In 1974 prices fel l 
back again, and compliance wi th the producers ' agreement provis ion was 
low. B raz i l , Colombia and Ivory Coast took the lead in organiz ing a 
producers ' car te l . The post-Opec climate provided a conf ident atmosphere 
for the possibi l i ty of a combined producers ' action aiming at pr ice i n -
creases. The di f ference wi th Opec though was a much smaller cohesion, 
as product ion of coffee is less concentrated geographical ly than o i l . But 
both organizations disposed of a dominant producer , which could enforce 
consensus. In November 1974 a producer cartel was formed in Caracas to 
coordinate expor t sales. Nineteen countr ies represent ing 85% of wor ld 
exports combined to form the Café Sauves Centrales S.A. Company. This 
company intervened in the fu tu res market by matur ing f u t u r e s , thus 
enforc ing de l ivery which in t u r n squeezed supp ly . Furthermore i t carr ied 
out internat ional stocking of coffee (Jungui to and Pizano, 1981; p. 6 ) . 
I CA 1976 
In 1975, the announcement of a ve ry severe f ros t in the most important 
producing areas in Brazi l sent prices up . Half of the ex is t ing t ree popu-
lation was destroyed by the f r os t . A t the same time Colombian product ion 
suf fered from heavy rains and f loods, and polit ical unrest in Angola af-
fected Robusta expor ts . 
In 1976, despite the fact that prices were r i s i n g , a new Agreement was 
negot iated. According to Gi lber t consumers judged tha t th rough par t ic ipa-
t ion they could exer t some inf luence on the producers (G i lbe r t , 1986; 
p. 27) . However, no agreement was reached on suppor t pr ices. The 1976 
Agreement incorporated a number of features. 
1 . A clear d iv is ion was made between member and non-member markets. 
The former was to be a quota market , the latter a non-quota market , 
designed to improve cont ro ls . 
2. Indiv idual quotas were d iv ided in f ixed and var iable pa r t s , the lat ter 
tak ing into account the size of the stocks held by each coun t r y . 
3. The possibi l i ty of in t roduc ing an in ternat ional ly control led reserve 
69 
stock was discussed, bu t dismissed. The Unctad framework of the I n -
tegrated Programme fo r Commodities Prices Stabil ization fo r the ten 
'core' commodities was at issue, bu t a discussion on the in t roduct ion of 
a bu f fe r stock policy in coffee led to the dismissal of th is idea. 
4. Ver i f icat ion of stocks and promotion were resumed. 
5. The Diversi f icat ion Fund was scrapped from the Agreement, and d i -
vers i f icat ion became the expl ic i t responsib i l i ty of producing countr ies. 
The supply-demand balance was such tha t a shortage of coffee existed 
in 1976 and consumers d id not advocate a d ivers i f icat ion policy (Kahn , 
1978; p. 186). 
Unl ike former agreements, the 1976 Agreement requi red tha t quota res t r i c -
t ions were not to come into force unt i l coffee prices fel l to a stated level . 
The bottom pr ice was, f i xed by the Counci l , and was to be below the 
average prices of Other Mild and Robusta coffee in 1975 (Kahn , 1978; p. 
183). 
In the Agreement a clause was included which empowered the Council 
to establish a Composite Indicator Price, instead of using the market pr ice 
of any par t icu lar var ie ty ( A r t . 33, ICA 1976). 
Failure to agree on the suppor t pr ice composition led to actions by 
Brazi l and Colombia. With El Salvador, I vo ry Coast and Mexico they co-
ordinated expor t sales via the Compania Salvadorena which intervened 
heavi ly in the fu tu res market . In 1977, t rade in fu tu res was suspended 
and the Commodity Futures Trade Commision f i led a complaint against u n -
authorized t rade practices in 1979 ( K u h n , 1985; p. 995). In August 1978, 
when prices reached a br ie f low at the New York market , the Bogota 
group was established (B raz i l , Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Hondurs , Mexico, Venezuela). They set up a fund fo r the co-
ordinat ion and f inance of stockholding and also par t l y fo r the manipulation 
of the London and New York markets. In 1979, t rad ing on the fu tu res 
market was l imi ted, and the organizat ion was left wi th large losses (G i l -
be r t , 1986; p. 28) . Jungui to and Pizano state that 'these operations were 
f inanced by Euro dollar loans' (Jungu i to and Pizano, p. 10). The i n t r u -
sion upon industr ia l ized countr ies ' exclusive markets of f u t u r e s , led the 
US to res t r i c t LDC's operations on i ts market . The rules were changed 
and the consortium was pressed to eliminate i ts actions as a precondit ion 
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fo r a new Internat ional Coffee Agreement. 
In 1980, prices had come down, and in order to redress th is t r e n d , 
the Bogota group met in Mexico Ci ty in May 1980, and set up a new 
company, Pancafé Productores de Café S .A. which was to formally under -
take the suppor t act iv i t ies of the Bogota group and absorb previous 
losses of Pancafé. Despite the wi thhold ing of suppl ies, prices continued to 
slide th roughout 1980, and in September consumers agreed to activate the 
economic pr ice suppor t provis ions of ICA 1976, on condit ion tha t Pancafé 
would cease its act iv i t ies . 
The cu r ren t composite indicator was establ ished, and quotas were i n -
sta l led. The quota d is t r ibu t ion in 1980 was based on a cont ingency 
formula, whereby each coun t ry would have i ts share calculated on the 
basis of the best histor ical product ion level in one of the two per iods: 
1968/72 or 1976/ 78 (Gordon, 1984; p. 216). Th is quota allocation proce-
dure formed a compromise between Af r ican count r ies , w i th expanding 
product ion , and Braz i l , whose ou tpu t had fa l len . Between 1975 and 1980 
many expor t ing countr ies had substant ia l ly increased the i r p lant ings in 
response to the favourable prices prevai l ing in previous years. Ad jus t -
ments to the agreed formula were made possible because Angola, thwar ted 
by c iv i l war , could no longer fu l f i l the quota to which i t was en t i t l ed . 
The leeway th is p rov ided , and because Brazi l was st i l l rebu i ld ing i ts 
stocks and thus declar ing shor t fa l l s , gave other countr ies the oppor tun i t y 
to obtain a larger quota share (Dauster , 1986; p. 2 / 3 ) . 
Discussion 
From the foregoing discussion on controls in the internat ional coffee 
market , a number of points stand ou t . I t can be concluded tha t some form 
of in tervent ion at most periods from 1940-1986 ex is ted , ei ther in the form 
of producer cartel or producer-consumer agreements. In the absence of 
the la t te r , producer alliances have on var ious occasions rest r ic ted ex-
po r t s , bu t the i r main problem was the lack of controls on the compliance 
wi th quotas. Especially before the establishment of ICA 1962 under which 
cert i f icates of or ig in were int roduced in 1965/66, no formal procedure fo r 
control ex is ted. Later, in 1973 fo r instance, producers used stat ist ical 
information on the or ig in of imported coffee in consuming countr ies to 
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enforce unilateral export restriction schemes. 
The producers' actions always included the most important producers 
Brazil and Colombia, joined by other Latin American producers and, on 
some occasions, other important exporters from Africa. The dominance of 
Brazil, politically supported by Colombia, provided a consensus on quota 
distribution both within and outside the I CA framework (Gilbert, 1986; p. 
46). This was important enough for previous producer alliances to con-
tinue export restriction in order to sustain prices. As Brazil was the 
dominant stockholder with about 80% of world stocks, the threat of put-
ting this on the market led other producers to agree on overall export 
restrictions. Colombian cooperation helped to give a large coverage of the 
coffee market. 
The most important instruments which producers' alliances used in 
sustaining or increasing prices, were export restriction schemes. Within 
the ICA framework this took the form in 1973 of undershipments, while 
before 1962 and between 1973 and 1980 quotas were allotted among the 
participants. It was always diff icult for producer alliances to verify the 
retention efforts and sanction violations. Within the ICA framework it was 
the consumers' task to control and police the Agreements regulations. 
These difficulties led producer alliances to design their strategies 
through price mechanisms (Junguito and Pizano, 1981; p. 6). The Pro-
ducers' Group interventions in 1974 and 1975 as well as its actions in 
1977-1979 were oriented towards reducing the market supply by maturing 
futures in the futures market, and by international stockpiling. Another 
way to influence price formation, possible because of exporting govern-
ments' direct intervention in coffee affairs, was through the surrender 
price scheme or minimum export prices. Countries using an established 
exchange control system compromised exporters to hand in a minimum 
amount of foreign exchange to the central bank per bag exported, thus 
forcing them to sell at minimum export prices. 
Important conditions for establishing interventions were the market 
situations in current prices and stocks, as well as the production expect-
ed to come to the market. The influence of sudden frosts or droughts in 
Brazil on various occasions disrupted or accelerated market trends and to 
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a large extent influenced the negotiating position of producers and con-
sumers. 
5.4 Problems with the system of export quotas 
General problems 
An export quota system with historically determined quotas has four 
general problems (Gilbert, 1986; p. 15). 
1. It tends to freeze the distribution of production, resulting eventually 
in inefficiency. 
2. It fails to make allowance for planned growth in exports, so that 
countries with rapidly expanding production have little incentive for 
membership. 
3. It provides an incentive for illegal or quasi legal evasion. 
4. It may encourage countries to overexport in non-control periods so as 
to establish larger quota entitlements. 
The rigidity of the quota system benefits the historically larger pro-
ducers, as quota are determined on an ad hoc basis, whereas perhaps 
more efficient smaller producers and countries with expanding production 
are effectively constricted. As the global quota cake has to be divided 
among exporting members, an expansion of one member's individual quota 
will necessarily involve a quota reduction for one or more other exporting 
members, given only a gradual increase in importing members consump-
tion. 
The outcome of the quota negotiations is determined by factors like a 
country's political leverage, power and negotiation abil i ty. The main goal 
of member countries is to maximize their export revenues, whereas the 
argument of efficiency is mainly used by critics of the static export quota 
distribution system, who stress that the market is prevented to do its 
work: the highest exports with the most efficient producers. However, 
the export quota system has not led to lack of incentive to become pro-
ducing member of the Coffee Agreement, as the major consumers are all 
member. 
The th i rd general problem with historically determined export quotas 
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according to Gilbert is the incentive to illegal or quasi legal evasion. As 
the Agreement is an international market regulation, there are many loop-
holes and opportunity for f raud. Administration in exporting countries in 
general is not very accurate and allows evasion of the provisions of the 
Agreement. In the course of the history of the Agreements, a more 
refined system of controls has gradually been developed, and is still 
being adapted. 
The fourth problem Gilbert discerns is the potential encouragement for 
countries to overexport in non-control periods to obtain larger quota 
entitlements. This can sow the seed for oversupply in future periods if 
governmental organizations allow domestic producer prices to increase 
production in reaction to world market prices. 
The allocation of quotas 
Alhough both the 1976 and the 1983 Agreements contained detailed pro-
vision for automatically determining the distribution of export quotas 
among exporting countries, this has, in practice, never been applied. As 
Table. 5.4. Share in global basic quota for selected countries, 
1982-85 (percentages). 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Cote d ' Ivo i re 
Indonesia 
Mexico 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
82/83 
30.3 
16.3 
7.3 
4.6 
3.6 
4.5 
3.4 
70.0 
Coffee year 
83/84 
30.5 
16.1 
7.2 
4.5 
3.6 
4.4 
3.4 
69.7 
84/85 
30.5 
16.1 
7.7 
4.6 
3.6 
4.4 
3.4 
70.3 
Source: ICO QSB 36, 1986. 
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such, the quota allocation has remained subject to an annual ad hoc dis-
tr ibut ion. 
The quota distribution among the larger .producers has remained fair ly 
stable for the last years (see Table 5.4), though recently considerable 
pressure from both expanding producers and consuming countries has 
been put on this status quo situation, from different motives. 
Mainly because of the high prices prevailing in the late seventies, there 
was an increase in planting in a number of countries. The results of this 
are now beginning to enter the market (Dauster, 1986; p. 4). At the 
Council meeting of September 1986 seven producing members requested a 
larger market share, thus putting especially Brazil's market share under 
strong pressure. Brazil in 1986/87 was not able to fulf i l its export quota, 
as drought had greatly reduced production and the expanding producers 
asked for an adjustment of Brazil's market share. In 1980, requests from 
countries with expanding production had been accommodated by the re-
duction of the quota Angola had agreed to, since the political situation 
from 1975 onwards had greatly reduced production and exports (Dauster, 
1986; p. 4). This had given a number of producing members a larger 
quota, without altering the quotas of the other producers. In 1986 the 
step by the dissident producers was backed by consuming countries, 
which argued in favour of the implementation of Ar t . 35 of ICA 1983, 
concerning quota distribution on the basis of both historical basic quota 
and the current volume of verified stocks. Allen Wallis of the US Depart-
ment of State remarked that "in order to stabilize prices effectively and 
efficiently the Agreement had to reallocate quotas according to an ex-
porter's available supply; unfilled quotas should be reallocated to others 
quickly and efficiently. In fact, the rigidity of the allocations under the 
ICA means that some members have diff iculty fi l l ing their quotas. For 
others, many of them countries of importance to the US the quota allo-
cation is insufficient to market their coffee to member countries, so they 
have to find non-member outlets. This is the unfortunate outcome of any 
quota allocation system which reflects export performance of an earlier 
period. In addition, réallocations of quota are subject to political bargain-
ing in the producer caucus instead of reflecting a country's competitive 
ability or the political interests of consuming countries" (Wallis, 1986; 
p. 23). 
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The market si tuat ion du r i ng the most recent quota disputes was formed 
by a gradual ly increasing oversupp ly , the causes of which have already 
been mentioned, and a d rough t in Brazi l wh ich , fo r a shor t per iod , sent 
the composite indicator pr ice to such levels that quota had to be sus-
pended. Reintroduct ion of the quotas was possible when in mid-1986 the 
pr ice went below the pr ice level of 134.5 dollarcents per pound. In the 
Council however, no agreement was reached on the quota d i s t r i bu t i on . 
For the f i r s t time in the h is tory of ICA, consumers act ively sought to i n -
f luence the quota d is t r ibu t ion system and to hamper consensus among 
producers . Th is consumer a t t i tude ref lected the general climate su r round -
ing commodity agreements. In 1985 the T in Agreement had col lapsed, and 
in tervent ions on internat ional commodity markets were general ly being 
viewed wi th less enthousiasm (see also Gi lber t , 1986; p. 1/48). 
The consumer a t t i tude in attempts to reduce Brazi l 's market share, 
(wh i ch , w i th the proposed scheme is sure to take place as i ts stocks are 
at ra ther low levels) is fed by the fact tha t Brazi l has an unstable p ro -
duct ion volume and is responsible fo r a large par t of wor ld product ion 
var iat ion (see Chapter 2 ) . The sudden downward swings in product ion 
have caused large upswings in prices (1976-1980; 1986) leading to large 
increases in the import values of coffee fo r consuming countr ies. A 
smaller Brazi l ian quota would help the s tab i l i ty of supp ly . On the other 
hand , the Brazi l ian debt service is based on expor t revenues of which 
coffee exports form around 10%. A large share of th is debt is owed to US 
banks. As such , the mainly Brazi l ian-US cont roversy is also related to 
similar aspects in the polit ical arena. The European Coffee Federation has 
requested the determination of expor t quotas on the basis of 'shopping 
l i s ts ' . The most p re fe r red composition of demand of all consuming coun-
t r ies has been proposed to form the basis for a quota d i s t r i bu t i on . This 
would lead to a reduct ion in Brazi l ian expor ts , and an increase in the 
more popular Colombian and Other Mild coffees. The rationale behind the 
off icial consumer proposal concerning the automatic determination of 
quotas i s , apart f rom helping stabi l i ty of supp ly , the overal l stimulation 
of supp ly . Fur thermore, the sale of excess product ion at lower prices to 
non-member consumers such as the Eastern Bloc would be reduced, as 
th is would decrease an expor t ing member's entit lement to i ts var iable 
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quota share. 
A primary concern of consuming countries is thus the guarantee of a 
secure supply at stable prices. To help obtain this objective, a quasi 
buffer stock or international reserve stock has been proposed (Wallis, 
1986; p. 24; Kahn, p. 190). Also the ICA 1983 Ar t . 51 states that the 
Council has to undertake a study of the feasibility of supporting the ob-
jectives of the Agreement by an international stock arrangement. An in-
ternational stock policy however, is very diff icult to implement with a 
heterogeneous product like coffee. The composition of the stock would 
have to take into account issues such as variability of production and 
exports of certain types, demand pattern for certain types and the over-
all size of the stock. As Brazilian production and exports have been 
subject to the strongest variations, its produce should form a very large 
share of this reserve stock. The costs of maintaining a sufficiently large 
stock to be released on the market when indicated by price rises would 
be very high. Apart from interest costs and storage costs, the stored 
produce would need rejuvenation or replacement, as coffee can be stored 
for only a limited period (three to five years). The advantage of an in-
ternational stock arrangement near the international markets would be the 
quick reaction to price rises. Logistical problems and economic compul-
sions in the past have caused only the slow release of available stocks in 
producing countries, thereby aggravating the generally strong reactions 
of futures markets to alarming news. 
Brazil and Colombia, however, are heavily opposed to this proposal, as 
it reduces their opportunities to influence the market by unilateral actions 
and, in the long run , might endanger their current market shares. Along 
with the practical problems in composing the buffer stock, and the pr in-
cipal reluctance of some consumer members to increased intervention, 
these expected consequences have put the amendment to export quota to 
one side. 
The non-quota market 
One of the major consequences of the inherent r igidity of the quota 
distribution system is the gradual increase of exports to non-member 
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countries. Countries with expanding production and stocks are faced with 
export quotas which do not increase as rapidly as the amount available 
for exports, and thus they look for a leeway which is provided by non-
member countries. In the 1962 and 1968 Agreements a provision was made 
for exports to non-member countries with low per capita consumption and 
considerable potential for expansion of demand (Ar t . 40 (1962); Ar t . 40 
(1968)). The most important countries, which were listed in Annex B of 
both agreements were those of the Eastern Bloc, the Middle East and 
South Africa. Consumption in the non-member countries in the periods 
covered by both agreements was low and almost all exports were covered 
by the economic provisions of the agreements ( In 1961, 6.1% of all imports 
were to non-member countries (Geer, 1971; p. 248)). The total annual 
global quota was adjusted to the exports to the 'new' markets (Hoffmeyer, 
1976; p. 93). 
No mention was made of discounts given to non-member countries, as 
Brazil, with the major part of world producer stocks, conducted its own 
oligopolistic price policy. In 1976/77 exports to non-member countries 
constituted 9% of all exports (Hermann, 1984; p. 142). The absence of 
Table 5 .5 . 
76/77 
80/81 
81/82 
82/83 
83/84 
84/85 
Exports per dest inat ion, 
(1 ) 
exports to 
all destinations 
53,315 
59,439 
63,653 
65,777 
70,052 
68,939 
(2 ) 
expor ts 
members 
48,698 
51,646 
54,649 
55,248 
60,020 
57,548 
1976-85. 
to 
(3 ) 
expor ts to 
non-members 
4,617 
7,793 
9,004 
10,529 
10,032 
11,391 
3/1 x 100% 
8,6 
13,1 
14,1 
16,0 
14,3 
16,5 
n.a. = not available 
Source: ICO QSB 1986, Hermann, 1984. 
Table 5.6. Exports by export ing members to non members. October-September 1979/80 to 1984/85 (000 bags) 
Exporting member 
Total 
Sub-total : members 
entit led to basic quota 
Colombian milds 
Colombia 
Kenya 
Tanzania 
Other milds 
Costa Rica 
Domenican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
India 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Papua New Guinea 
Peru 
Brazilian & O. Arabicas 
Brazil 
Ethiopia 
Robustas 
Angola 
Indonesia 
OAMCAF 
- Benin 
- Cameroon 
- Central Afr ican Republic 
- Congo 
- Cote d ' Ivoire 
- Gabon 
- Madagascar 
- Togo 
Philippines 
Uganda 
Zaïre 
Sub-total : members 
exempt from basic quota 
Arabicas 
Bolivia 
Burundi 
Cuba 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Malawi 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Rwanda 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Robustas 
Equatorial Guinea 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Tr in idad & Tobago 
1979/80 
(1) 
6,128 
5,850 
969 
562 
49 
58 
1,027 
-^o 91 
174 
13 
2 
2 
623 
37 
28 
1 
37 
2,126 
Ï7ÏÏÜ5 
317 
1,758 
600 
117 
(822) 
0 
18 
0 
0 
843 
0 
161 
0 
49 
163 
8 
249 
219 
~2B 
13 
49 
0 
-
2 
0 
55 
3 
0 
0 
72 
30 
0 
15 
2 
0 
2 
2 
-
10 
1980/81 
(2) 
7,793 
7,534 
1,122 
^ 7 3 7 
95 
290 
1,797 
263 
107 
180 
27 
119 
78 
689 
69 
137 
118 
11 
2,749 
2;4?6 
273 
1,867 
451 
366 
(979) 
0 
83 
-0 
627 
0 
268 
0 
4 
38 
28 
260 
223 
-Vi 
5 
88 
0 
-
1 
0 
91 
7 
0 
0 
17 
37 
0 
8 
19 
0 
0 
1 
-
9 
October-
1981/82 
(3) 
"9,004 
8 
1 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1 
(1 
,652 
,609 
943 
402 
264 
,306 
336 
59 
307 
2 
651 
6 
602 
38 
111 
174 
20 
,681 
;s?2 
109 
,056 
317 
,450 
,186) 
0 
107 
0 
0 
786 
0 
292 
0 
2 
73 
28 
352 
312 
" ÏÜ 
35 
122 
0 
2 
-
0 
83 
50 
0 
0 
9 
£L 
0 
3 
31 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6 
-September 
1982/83 
(4) 
10,529 
10,214 
999 
7ÜS 
136 
154 
4,736 
609 
-435 
375 
235 
481 
534 
2,231 
484 
170 
181 
1,907 
1,735 
172 
2,572 
279 
1,567 
(718) 
0 
187 
0 
0 
408 
0 
124 
0 
2 
0 
5 
315 
260 
~5 
0 
135 
0 
-
0 
0 
56 
50 
0 
0 
13 
55 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
48 
6 
1983/84 
(5) 
10,017 
9,841 
1,064 
836 
125 
102 
3,297 
-"STT 
-166 
396 
33 
210 
422 
830 
116 
298 
255 
3,003 
2,821 
182 
2,478 
161 
2,107 
(207) 
0 
44 
0 
0 
163 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
-
176 
168 
1 
0 
102 
0 
-
0 
0 
30 
0 
0 
0 
35 
8 
D 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
2 
1984/85 
(6) 
11,400 
10,956 
1,193 
919 
274 
-
4,897 
" 8 8 7 
36 
311 
60 
1,258 
439 
593 
1,026 
38 
21 
228 
1,977 
1,8iô 
159 
2,889 
187 
2,571 
(101) 
0 
-0 
0 
90 
0 
11 
0 
1 
0 
5 
444 
201 
-u 0 
45 
-
-
0 
0 
59 
0 
0 
0 
87 
242 
"15 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
242 
1 
Due to rounding the totals may not always reflect the sum in the relevant components. 
- Less than 500 bags. 
Quarter ly Statistical Bul le t in , number 35, July September, Information received up to January 30th, 1986. 
Statistics on Coffee Organizat ion, International Coffee Organization. 
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export restrictions in the period 1973-1980 meant that no difference 
existed in prices between the member and the non-member market, and 
exports were possible to every country paying the world market price. 
When, in 1980 quotas were reintroduced, this again led to a division 
between the member and non-member market. 
In 1980/81, 13% of total exports by exporting members were directed 
towards non-member consumers, and this increased in 1984/85 to 16.5% of 
all exports (see Table-5.5). These exports were, to a large extent, 
directed towards the Eastern Bloc. Comecon imports for 1984/85 are esti-
mated at 4.3 million bags, almost half of total non-member exports (ECF, 
1985; p. 2). 
Figure 5.3. Unit value of exports of coffee to members and non-mem-
bers, quartly averages commencing October-December 1986. 
US cents par lb 
170 
160 - I 
150 J (1:10:80) 
140 _ 
130 _ 
120 _ 
110 
100 
90 
80 
70 -
60 -
50 -
40 
30 -
20 -
10 -
-QUOTAS IN EFFECT-
(18:2:861 
f F rost in Brazil TO MEMBERS 
TO NON-MEMBERS 
Drought i\t 
Brazil 
QUOTAS SUSPENOEO 
(19:2:86) 
M J S M J S M J S M J S M J S M J S 
Quarter D D D D O D o 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Source: ICO, EB 2382/84 Rev. 12, 1986. 
The major exporters to the non-quota market in 1984/85 were Indonesia 
(2,6 million bags), Brazil (2,3 million bags) and Colombia, Guatemala and 
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Mexico. Table 5.6 shows that a few countries were responsible for the 
exports to the non-quota market. It is interesting that there are no 
African non-members exports. 
For a number of these exporters, exports to the non-quota market al-
most equalled their quota market exports in volume. The average price of 
exported coffee to the non-quota market relative to the quota market 
price since the instalment of the quota system showed a strong decline 
from the end of 1981 up to mid 1984, when prices were half of that pre-
vailing on the quota market (Figure 5.3). To explain the formation of this 
considerably large second market production figures must f i rs t be studied 
closely. As a result of the high prices in the period 1976-1978 in a 
number of countries, coffee tree planting was stimulated, especially in 
those countries where governmental organizations had passed through the 
prices prevailing on the world market. These had tripled in real terms. 
Production had increased from 20 million bags in Brazil and 11,8 million 
bags in Columbia in 1978/79 to 32 million bags in Brazil in 1982/82 and 14 
million bags in Colombia in 1980/81. 
Indonesia, Costa Rica, Honduras and India had also increased their 
production considerably (see Table 2.7). Storage of production was espe-
cially poor in Costa Rica and Guatemala (FT, 16 sept. 1985), and African 
countries were also confronted by this problem. This provided a stimulus 
for exports to non-member countries. In 1982, many countries began 
facing severe balance of payment problems as commodity prices were low 
and a number of countries faced heavy foreign debts. In order to in -
crease the inflow of foreign exchange, countries entered the non-quota 
market, offering large discounts for coffee of qualities similar to that on 
the quota markets. 
A side effect of this market separation was the encouragement it pro-
vided for il l icit trade. Some estimates place the volume of the Tourist 
Coffee at 3 million bags. Considerable profits could be made by re-export-
ing coffee from the non-member market to member markets. 
The discounts given to non-members angered the consuming members 
who had to pay substantially higher prices. They argued that they were 
subsidizing consumption in non-member countries of which the Eastern 
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Bloc was the most important . The US s t rong ly opposed the operation of a 
two- t ie r market . Wallis, the Under Secretary fo r Economic Af fa i rs of the 
US Department of State, declared tha t benefi ts to the Eastern Bloc were 
estimated at about 110 million dollar annual ly (Wall is, 1986; p. 20) . 
According to Kaul , consumers had l i t t le legitimate complaint since the i r 
supp ly needs were supposedly being well met and Agreement obligations 
on supply were being fu l f i l l ed (Kau l , 1986; p. 7 ) . However, growing 
competitiveness among the var ious producers for some share of the non-
member market eventual ly caused the expor ters to delay shipments to 
member countr ies in order to of fer deals to interested non-member pu r -
chases. R. Praeger, US representat ive at the ICO was the one who l inked 
non-members' sales to undershipments of expor te rs . The supply was 
thereby t ightened and stocks, or ig ina l ly serv ing as a bu f fe r against sup-
ply t i gh tness , were depleted (Praeger, 1985). 
Th is ensued ar t i f ic ia l t ightness of supply on the member market induced 
consuming members to push fo r new rules to govern sales by members to 
the non-member market . A t the Apr i l 1985 Board meeting Resolution 336 
(WP 5/85 ICO) was adopted whereby any f u t u r e sales to the non-member 
market were requi red to be at prices no less than those paid by ICO 
members fo r coffees of comparable qual i ty (Kau l , 1986; p. 7 ) . In i t ia l l y , 
th is amendment decreased the pr ice d i f ferent ia l between the two markets, 
and the di f ference was to disappear when quotas were suspended on 
February 18th , 1986. 
Short fa l ls and undershipments 
A r t . 3 of ICA 1983 lays down that expor t ing members unable to fu l f i l l 
the i r allocated annual quota have to declare a short fa l l to the Counci l , six 
months before the end of the coffee year . To ensure tha t total global 
supply is not undercut by a member's inabi l i ty to expor t , the amount of 
the short fa l l has to be red is t r ibu ted proport ional ly among the other ex-
por te rs . Failure to declare a short fa l l renders the coun t ry formal ly liable 
to a penalty in the form of a reduced quota share in the fol lowing year . 
Nevertheless on several occasions, expor t ing members have fai led to 
declare short fa l ls and th is has given rise to serious disputes in the 
Counci l . In May 1986 global quota increases of 1 mill ion bags were i n -
82 
duced by the inability of some African' producers to export their quota in 
full (Roberts, 1985; p. 21). The 1986 drought in Brazil has led to a dis-
astrous reduction of exportable production. The shortfall from its annual 
quota is such that even the suspension of quota restrictions has not been 
able to restore equilibrium. Several minor exporters have been able to 
ful ly export their quota only with the utmost dif f iculty. Ethiopia in 
1984/85 encountered logistical problems because of political str i te, and a 
number of West African countries faced harvest failures in 1982/83 due to 
climatic conditions. Both from the point of view of supply as from that of 
price, consumer members are very anxious to ensure that quotas are 
entirely f i l led. Producer members however are not very anxious to declare 
shortfalls since this may influence future quota negotiations. A country 
that admits officially to be unable to comply with its supply obligations is 
put in a diff icult negotiating position. Consumer members have repeatedly 
clearly stressed the problem of undeclared shortfalls, but the practice of 
the last six years does not confirm their anxiety over supply. 
Closely related to the shortfall debate between producers and consumers 
is the problem of undershipments. In I CA 1983 this has been defined as 
"the difference between the annual export entitlement of an exporting 
member in a given coffee year and the amount of coffee which that 
member has exported to quota markets in that coffee year unless this 
difference is a shortfall" (A r t . 3) . Furthermore, to maintain an orderly 
flow of coffee to the world markets, exporters are not permitted to export 
more than 25% of their allotted quota per quarter (Ar t . 36, I CA 1983). 
Consumers state that exporters frequently fail to comply with this obliga-
tion and do not distribute their quota evenly over the four quarters, 
thus causing an artificial tightness of supply for certain types of coffee 
in certain periods. Some importers have argued, as the US did at the 
1985 ICA Council Meeting, that some exporting members deliberately 
undership in order to increase prices. It is also said that some producers 
undership in order to await the Brazilian winter effects (May-August) 
when the risk of frost occurs. Exporting countries, though, maintain that 
the pattern of shipments reflects the seasonal nature of production, and 
the slow response of exports to quota increases in a rising market is 
blamed by exporters on logistical problems. Both landlocked countries 
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especially l ike Uganda and Burund i and countr ies wi th harbours l ike 
Colombia have to deal wi th a limited por t i n f ras t ruc tu re when handl ing 
sudden increases in exports (Financial Times, January 11th , 1986). 
As described under non-quota expor t s , consumers have l inked the 
occurrence of undershipments to the rise in sales to non-member coun-
t r i e s . They state tha t expor ters have g iven preference to non-member 
sales in execut ing orders ( in the l igh t of the st rong competition on th is 
market) and thus undershipped the i r quar te r l y quotas to the market 
(Kau l , 1986; p. 7 ) . In the past , the larger expor ters have undershipped 
the i r quotas in order to sustain wor ld market pr ices, and have done so 
wi th in the I CA f ramework. This formed one of the disagreements between 
consumers and producers in the 1968 Agreement, when the US complained 
about expor ters not expor t ing the i r quota in f u l l . In 1973 the Producers 
Group (Geneva Group) also undershipped the i r quota allowances, using 
the st i l l ex is t ing controls on import ing countr ies to undertake the p ro -
ducers s t ra tegy (Jungui to and Pizano, 1981; p. 6 ) . Within the cu r ren t 
ICA, annual undershipments are only small (see Table 5 .7 ) . Consumers' 
Tabel 5 .7 . Global quota and actual expor t by all expor t ing 
members (mil l ion bags) , 1980-85. 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
Source: ICO, 
Global 
quota 
51.4 
55.4 
55.2 
60.2 
58.2 
QSB 35. 
Actual 
expor ts 
51.6 
54.6 
55.2 
60.0 
57.5 
Difference quota 
exported (%) 
+ 0.5% 
- 1.5% 
0 % 
- 0.3% 
- 1.2% 
complaint, tha t producers do not evenly d i s t r i bu te the i r quota over the 
quar ter seems, on aggregate not to be j us t i f i ed . However, fo r specif ic 
types of coffee th is may well be the case. 
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The problem of the instability of the dollar 
The price objective of I CA since 1980/81 has been to maintain the 15-
day moving average of the composite indicator price between 1.20 dollar-
cents and 1.40 dollarcents per pound, with quota adjustments at 1.15, 
1.20, 1.40, 1.45 and 1.50 dollars. The denomination of the composite indi-
cator price in dollars did put the agreement under pressure in 1971 when 
the Agreement of Bretton Woods broke down, and the dollar began (tem-
porarily then, and for good in 1973) a free float against the other major 
currencies. As the purchasing power of each coffee dollar measured in 
other major currencies decreased, coffee-exporting countries asked for a 
revision of the price range. This was not agreed to and was one of the 
factors which led to the disintegration of ICA 1968 in 1973. Recently, the 
strong appreciation of the dollar between 1980 and 1985 caused a strong 
increase in the domestic currency price of coffee for non-dollar linked 
importers, among which were the major markets in Europe. Coffee prices 
in dollars however remained fair ly stable during this period. For example 
between the fourth quarter of 1980 and that of 1984, the average world 
coffee price measured by the CIP in dollar terms increased 8.4% whereas 
the average coffee price in German marks during the same period in-
creased by 73%. In French francs this increase amounted 131%, and in 
Table 5.8. Price of coffee (CIP) in domestic currencies, for selected 
countries in the fourth quarter: 1980 and 1984. 
Country 
Germany (DM) 
France (FFr) 
United Kingdom (£) 
United States (US$) 
1980 
IV 
1.911 
4.422 
0.419 
1.2363 
1984 
IV 
3.053 
9.363 
0.822 
1.3404 
Change 
+ 73 % 
+ 130 % 
+ 112.7% 
+ 8.4% 
Source: IMF, 1986. 
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Table 5 .9 . Production of Arabica and Robusta in countr ies producing 
both types (000 bags) . 
Crop year 
commencing 
1982/83 
Total 
Arabica 
Robusta 
% of Robusta 
to total 
1983/84 
Total 
Arabica 
Robusta 
% of Robusta 
to total 
1984/85 
Total 
Arabica 
Robusta 
% of Robusta 
to total 
1985/86 
Total 
Arabica 
Robusta 
% of Robusta 
to total 
Uganda 
1 Oct . 
3200 
220 
2980 
93.1 
3400 
240 
3160 
92.9 
3500 
245 
3255 
93.0 
3300 
250 
3050 
92.4 
India 
1 Oct. 
2166 
1238 
928 
42.8 
1750 
1178 
572 
32.7 
3166 
1333 
1833 
57.0 
2166 
1033 
1133 
52.3 
Brazi l 
1 A p r . 
16175 
14565 
1610 
10.0 
30383 
28283 
2100 
6.9 
21805 
19715 
2090 
9.6 
32616 
29956 
2660 
8.2 
Tanzania 
1 Jul 
889 
681 
209 
23.5 
827 
636 
191 
23.1 
818 
637 
181 
22.1 
890(e) 
707 
183 
20.6 
Indonesia 
1 A p r . 
5333 
533 
4800 
90.0 
6000 
600 
5400 
90.0 
6000 
600 
5400 
90.0 
6000 
600 
5400 
90.0 
Ecuador 
1 A p r . 
1414 
813 
601 
42.5 
1374 
748 
626 
45.6 
1502 
837 
665 
44.3 
1975 
1210 
765 
38.7 
(e) Estimated 
Source: ICO, WP board , 635/86 
English pounds 112% (see Table 5 .8 ) . Coffee prices fo r consumers in 
non-dol lar based import ing countr ies thus s t rong ly increased as a resul t 
of the dollar appreciat ion. The European countr ies therefore argued that 
the range should be lowered. The fol lowing depreciat ion of the dollar 
against the other major currencies from February 1985 onwards again 
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worsened the terms of t rade of expor t ing count r ies , measured by non-
dollar cur renc ies: 
Th is ins tab i l i ty in the cu r rency of denomination of coffee prices has led 
to considerable d i f f icu l t ies (Be l t rao , 1986; p. 5 ) . Within the Internat ional 
Cocoa Organization ( ICCO) the ins tab i l i ty of the dol lar had led to the 
adoption of the SDR (Special Drawing Rights) as the un i t of denomination 
(Financial Times, July 18th, 1986). Since 1979 the SDR has been compos-
ed of a t rade-weighted value of the major f i ve currencies (US dol lar , 
German mark, Japanese y e n , French f ranc and English pound s te r l i ng ) . 
Instead of do l la rs , the indicator pr ice on which the buf fers tock manager 
bases his buy ing and sel l ing decisions is denominated in SDR, with the 
aims of making the Cocoa Agreement more immune to cur rency movements. 
Trade is st i l l conducted in do l lars . A major d i f ference between the Cocoa 
Agreement and the I CA is the membership of the US, which is not p re -
sented in the ICCO. This has probably faci l i tated the adoption of the 
SDR. So long as i t is a member of the ICA, the US wil l not allow a 
reduct ion in the role of the dollar as a key cu r rency . A number of 
scholars acknowledge the su i tab i l i ty of the SDR fo r pr ice stabil ization 
purposes (G i lbe r t , 1986; p. 2 1 ; Lanjouw, 1985; p. 1197). A t the Council 
meeting in February 1987, producers pu t fo rward the proposal to raise 
the off icial pr ice range from 120-140 to 134-154 US cents. However, th is 
idea was not welcomed by consumers ( A g r i Serv ice, no. 234; March 7 t h , 
1987). I t can be concluded tha t the ins tab i l i ty of the dol lar has put a 
st ra in on the Agreement, bu t al terat ion of the un i t of denomination is not 
l i ke ly . 
Select iv i ty 
Select iv i ty entails the selective adaptation of a quota fo r a certain 
category of coffee as a resul t of pr ice movements, ref lect ing a change in 
consumers demand fo r that category. In previous Agreements (1962, 1968) 
provis ions were made fo r l imited increases in quotas when pr ices fo r a 
certain category indicated a r is ing demand. For example, had been 
granted to Af r ican expor ters who were facing expanding demand fo r the i r 
Robusta coffee. 
Gi lbert maintains tha t as in the cu r ren t Agreement no account is taken 
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on the allocation of quotas fo r the relat ive demands fo r d i f fe rent growths 
(Robusta, Mild Arabicas and unwashed Arabicas) and d i f fe rent grades 
wi th in the g rowths , the resul t has been a t ightness of supply fo r 
par t icu lar var iet ies of coffee at times when addit ional supplies have been 
available in the producing count r ies . These countr ies have however not 
been allowed to expor t these addit ional supplies to the member consumers, 
since the i r quota has been f u l l . Th is according to Gi lber t , const i tutes a 
welfare loss, generated by the inherent in f lex ib i l i t y of the quota system 
(G i lbe r t , 1986, p. 30) . In the 1986 Council meet ing, consumers argued 
tha t before February 1986, when quotas were suspended, the quota 
d is t r ibu t ion between producers was unreal ist ics as i t d id not accurately 
ref lect demand and supply and thus encouraged pr ice f luctuat ions ( A g r i 
Serv ice, no. 233, 1987). 
However, wi th the increase in the number of countr ies growing more 
than one var ie ty of coffee (Table 5.9) supply is expected to react i n -
creasingly f lex ib le to demand for certain g rowths . The expanding Robusta 
product ion in Braz i l , begun in 1975 in the State of Parana, is a good 
example of th is t rend (Braz i l Count ry Report , 1981; ICO London). In 
India and Ecuador about half of total product ion is Robusta, whereas 
these countr ies are of f ic ia l ly classif ied as Other Mild producers . 
Table 5.10. Ini t ial and f inal global quota. 
In million bags per coffee year , 1980-86. 
Year 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
Init ial 
57.4 
56.0 
52.8 
56.2 
61.0 
58.0 
quota Final 
51.4 
55.1 
55.2 
60.2 
58.2 
(1) 
quota Difference 
- 6.0 
- 0.9 
+ 2.4 
+ 4.0 
- 2.8 
Source: ICO. 
( 1 ) . Quotas were suspended, February 1986. 
88 
In the 1983 Agreement no provision is made for these developments as 
the classification of producing countries is based on historical production 
tradit ion. One of the adverse effects of a quota market such as the I CA 
is that producers have less incentive to maintain the quality of their 
output. Those countries which have allowed coffee quality to deteriorate 
in the past five years, when quota were determining the exported quan-
t i ty and supply on the world market, could now face considerable com-
petition for their market shares from countries which have been able to 
improve their coffee quality. Schlüters indicates that this indeed is the 
case for African countries with the guaranteed producer price system, 
where little quality price differentiation is made (Schlüters, 1984; p. 4). 
As such, the quality of coffee (and the availability) may influence future 
quota allocation disputes between producing members. Two dimensions can 
thus be distinguished for the future quota allocation; availability, for 
which consuming members and producing members with expanding produc-
tion are arguing, and quality, which influences demand in the quota free 
period. It is not expected however that a system of selective adjustment 
of quota will again be introduced as happened with the 1962 and 1968 
Agreements. 
The size of the global quota 
As the instrument of price regulation, the size of the global quota to be 
distributed among the producing members has, not surprisingly, emerged 
as a central issue in annual meetings. Leading producing countries 
ordinarily favour low initial allotments, arguing their case for favouring 
more pessimistic consumption projections with examples of overstocking in 
consuming members and the existence of large volumes of imports in 
transit (Junguito and Pizano, 1981; p. 5). Symmetrically consuming 
countries overstate import requirements and stress the need for a gua-
ranteed supply. As in the producer arrangements which limited supply in 
the most recent period between 1973 and 1980, negotiations took place 
between the larger producers seeking to reduce world supplies and to 
spread stockkeeping more widely, and the smaller producers, whose 
target is to export the entire year's output. 
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In the ICA 1983 ( A r t . 34) some considerations have been laid down for 
determining the global annual quota for the coming coffee year . In prac-
t i ce , a number of influences work upon the global quota size in the 
course of the coffee year for which i t has been f i x e d . CIP movements may 
induce quota increases or decreases and so maintain the CIP wi th in the 
agreed boundaries. Fur thermore, the Council may adjust the global quota 
in the course of the coffee year as circumstances requ i re . Also, under-
shipments and undeclared short fa l ls may produce a deviat ion in the ini t ial 
and f inal global annual quota. The deviat ion is l isted for recent years in 
Table 5.10. 
5.5 Assessment 
As a basis for the evaluation of the effectiveness of the Internat ional 
Coffee Agreement, the complete last period for which the quotas were in 
ef fect , is considered. The period 1980-1986 comprises both ICA 1976 and 
ICA 1983. Because the provisions of both agreements are rather similar, 
the performance of ICA can be assessed although i t comprises two agree-
ments. The main objective of ICA entailed the stabi l izat ion of the indicator 
pr ice between 1.20 and 1.40 US dol lars. Except for a shor t period in 1984 
when the CIP exceeded 1.45 do l lars , th is goal was obtained (see Figure 
5 .4 ) . However, th is was accompanied by a number of disagreements 
between the par t ic ipants to the Agreement. As a resul t of the expansion 
of product ion in a number of count r ies , a large non-quota market de-
veloped where lower prices prevai led than on the quota market . Al though 
or ig ina l ly exports to the 'new markets' were encouraged by the Agree-
ment, consumer members complained tha t the i r supply needs were badly 
met. Also the phenomenon of re -expor t from non-quota markets to the 
quota market was an effect of the large non-quota market . Requests from 
expor t ing members wi th expanding product ion for a larger quota share 
were not met, since the quota d is t r ibu t ion was based on an ad hoc d is -
t r i bu t i on procedure and subject to polit ical barga in ing . This pu t con-
siderable pressure on the consensus in the Agreement par t l y caused by 
the reduct ion of the dominance of Braz i l . Under past agreements, Brazi l 
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Figure 5.4. 
1975-1986. 
Composite indicator price in current and constant terms, 
US cents per lb. 
SCO 
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NOTE: (1) Prices refer to »enge of Other Milds aid 
Prias 1978 up to September 1981 end Composite 
(2) Priese In constant term refer to priée* in 
of exports of mene^ eeeered goods from developed 
up to September 1976, Composite Indicator 
Indicator Priée 1979 thereafter. 
terms deflated by the U.M. index of unit «allies 
inaiaeteuinumres. (Bate: April-June 1980 -100). 
Source: ICO. 
with its large stocks enforced other producers to conform to its wishes. 
However, recently stocks were spread more evenly among producers Also, 
consumers wanted to influence the quota distribution more actively to 
ensure their supply, whereas in the past this was regarded an interpro-
ducer matter. Brazilian shortfalls seriously disupted the market stabil ity, 
and consumers argued for a quota distribution system based on exportable 
production and available stocks. This pressure on Brazil's market share, 
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both from producers seeking expansion of the i r quotas and from con-
sumers seeking to ensure a more stable f u t u r e supp ly , led to a continued 
suspension of quotas, as Brazi l refused to agree to a smaller quota. The 
ins tab i l i ty of the dollar also led to disputes among the members of the 
Agreement. Especially for non-dol lar importers and expor ters such as the 
Afr ican and Asian countr ies, the changing value of the dollar led to con-
siderable ext ra var iat ion of expor t receipts and import payments. The 
SDR however, accepted as the un i t of denomination in the Internat ional 
Cocoa Agreement was not an acceptable a l ternat ive fo r the US and Latin 
American expor te rs . 
I t can be concluded that the I CA achieved its goal of pr ice stabi l iza-
t i o n , bu t controversies among members grew and th is led to the decision 
not to re- in t roduce quotas in 1986, when th is would have been possible. 
Also the change in the internat ional polit ical climate can be held respons-
ible for the declined enthousiasm of consumer countr ies to take a f lex ib le 
stand towards the Agreement. The cu r ren t phase of the coffee product ion 
cycle which seems to be heading fo r a surp lus product ion , may have con-
t r i bu ted to th is consumer a t t i tude . 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
In the f i rs t chapter, the purpose of this report is described as pre-
senting an analysis of the international coffee market and the regulation 
of this market by the International Coffee Agreement ( ICA). The next 
four chapters, on production, consumption, trade and the agreement 
respectively, revolve around coffee prices, which are formed in the in-
teraction of these forces. In this final chapter, the results and conclu-
sions of the study are summarized. For convenience, the chapter division 
of the report is followed. 
Production 
Coffee is a tree crop. It takes about six years for the tree to give its 
normal yield. The economic life of the tree can reach f i f ty years. Coffee 
is not a homogeneous product, the two main types being Arabica and 
Robusta. Quality differences between and within the two types can be 
large, caused by ecological, climatic circumstances, and also by the way 
the coffee crop is processed. 
The systems under which coffee is commercially grown show a large 
diversity, ranging from large estates to smallholder units. In many coun-
tries there exists a dual production structure. On average, labour costs 
form at least half of total production costs. There is also a large variety 
of marketing systems in producing countries. In general, these are made 
up of the marketing channel and a marketing authority, through which 
the government influences the marketing process. The authority can take 
the form of a marketing board, or that of a parastatal organization. For 
many countries, coffee is the single or most important generator of 
foreign exchange. Usually the influence of the government therefore is 
strong, and is connected with export policies and tax collection. Prices 
paid to growers differ widely among countries. 
Since World War I I , the trend in production has been upwards. Until 
the f i f t ies, production was almost completely concentrated in Central and 
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South America. Now, more than 35% of world product ion is in Af r ica and 
South East Asia. From a long term perspect ive, the large drop of the 
Brazi l ian share of product ion is remarkable. The volume of wor ld p ro -
duct ion shows high year ly f luc tuat ions , mainly because of Brazi l ian crop 
fa i lures caused by f ros ts or d rough ts . 
The nature of growing coffee does not permit the volume of product ion 
to respond qu ick ly to pr ices. In the long te rm, pr ice elast ic i ty of 
product ion in some countr ies is ra ther s ign i f icant . 
Consumption 
Only 20% of wor ld coffee product ion is consumed in producing countr ies. 
Consumption is concentrated in Europe, North America and Japan. Per 
capita consumption is highest in Nor thern Europe. 
Processing of coffee (b lend ing , roast ing and g r i nd ing ) takes place in 
the consuming countr ies and is performed by a small number of large 
companies. The pract ice of maintaining a constant taste, corresponding to 
the local preference, limits the subst i tu tab i l i t y of the d i f fe rent types of 
coffee. For the processing of instant coffee, usually lower grades of cof-
fee are used. Coffee processing is bound to consumption centres for 
technological and economic reasons. Also polit ical fac to rs , in the form of 
t rade ba r r i e r s , are important . 
H is tor ica l ly , the volume of coffee consumption has been posi t ively cor-
related wi th r is ing incomes. Low to very low income elasticit ies of demand 
have recent ly been estimated for the EC and the US. In Japan, where per 
capita consumption is st i l l rather low, income elast ic i ty is estimated much 
h igher . Price elasticit ies of demand seem to be ve ry low, which means 
tha t , in genera l , the volume of coffee consumption is hard ly affected by 
pr ice changes. 
Trade 
The internat ional coffee market is formed by cash markets and fu tu res 
markets. These are all located in consuming countr ies. The markets in 
London and New York are the most prominent. Direct supply contracts 
between expor ters and importers using prices on the open markets as a 
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reference are of growing importance. 
Market participants consist of trade-interests (exporters, traders and 
processing firms) and non-trade interests (speculators). Whereas the 
different trade interests are highly concentrated, integration between the 
subsequent stages is almost non-existent. 
Price formation, which is inherently unstable because neither the f luc-
tuating production nor consumption respond much to price changes, is 
affected by the stocking policies of market participants. In the long term, 
coffee prices show a high correlation with world stock levels. A twenty-
year cycle has been observed in both stocks and prices. In the short 
term, price formation is heavily influenced by speculative activities on the 
futures markets. This holds especially for periods of uncertainty inside 
and outside the coffee market. 
The International Coffee Agreement 
Producing and consuming countries decided upon the f i rst ICA in 1962. 
This was renewed in 1968, 1976 and 1983. The 1983 Agreement, which is 
still in force, was signed by f i f ty producing countries representing 99% of 
world exports and twenty-five consuming countries with 85% of world im-
ports. The official objective is to stabilize coffee prices. The instrument 
used is a system of export quotas, which - depending on price develop-
ments - limits producing members' exports to consuming members' 
markets. The role of consuming members is to police producing members' 
adherence to the quota provisions. 
Intervention in the world market has a long history. In the f i rs t half of 
this century Brazil used to restrict its exports to the market unilaterally 
in order to sustain prices. Its absolute dominance in the export market 
made monopolistic price strategies possible. Later, because of a falling 
market share, Brazil had to seek the cooperation of other producers. By 
threatening to flood the market with accumulated stocks, Brazil was able 
on several occasions to enforce cooperation. Such producer alliances 
always met difficulties in verifying the retention efforts and sanctioning 
violations. The ICA can be considered as a special producer cartel, in 
that it is legitimized and sanctioned by consumers. Consuming countries 
participation is based on international political and economic motives. 
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The subsequent IC A's have encountered many problems. One major p ro -
blem is the d is t r ibu t ion of quotas. Formally these were to be d is t r ibu ted 
according to expor t performance and available stocks. However, Brazi l ian 
resistance prevented the application of the system, and an ad hoc system 
of quota d is t r ibu t ion was appl ied. Quota d is t r ibu t ion has not changed fo r 
a long t ime. This in f lex ib i l i t y also has implications fo r the consumers. 
Here the problem is the non-homogeneity of coffee, because changing 
consumer preferences have not been followed by adjustments of quotas, 
thus leading to t i gh t supply si tuat ions fo r certain var ie t ies . Other p ro -
blems the ICA faces include the desired size of the global quota, the 
problems of product ion and expor t short fa l ls and undershipments, and the 
heavy competition on the non-quota markets. Between 1980 and 1986 the 
non-quota market grew considerably. Prices on th is market , which con-
sisted of the Eastern Bloc countr ies and other non-members, were much 
lower than those prevai l ing on the quota market . The denomination of the 
reference pr ice in the dol lar , especially in periods of large exchange rate 
var iat ions also causes problems. A change from the US dollar towards a 
denomination in the more stable SDR, as applied in the Internat ional 
Cocoa Organizat ion, meets s t rong opposit ion from the American member 
count r ies . 
The ICA was successful in maintaining pr ice s tab i l i ty between 1980 and 
1986. This success was not wi thout cost. Even though the composite i n -
dicator pr ice reached i ts re in t roduct ion level ear ly in 1986, members of 
the agreement could not agree on the implementation of the quotas. The 
quota allocation was again the major problem. Failure to reach consensus 
ref lected the altered posit ion of Braz i l . Whereas in ear l ier agreements 
Brazi l had the power to enforce cooperat ion, now several producing and 
consuming members d id not accept i ts demands. This stand by consumer 
members may have been inf luenced by the expected oversupply of coffee 
in the coming years. The internat ional polit ical climate in internat ional 
commodity agreements has also undergone a d is t inc t change. A t the 
moment i t is d i f f i cu l t to say whether the ICA wil l su rv i ve . If no t , p ro -
ducing countr ies wil l probably t r y to arrange a new producer al l iance. 
T h i s , however, wil l be more d i f f i cu l t to achieve than in the past because 
the t radi t ional market leader, B raz i l , has lost much power. 
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APPENDIX 
Historical survey of developments in global coffee production 
In this appendix a description is given of the changes in global pro-
duction that have taken place throughout this century, beginning with 
the dominance of Brazil in the world coffee market and its unilateral 
actions of the start of the century to sustain and raise world market 
prices. Until 1940 Brazil applied a policy of export restrictions and 
national stockpiling. From 1940 onwards this was followed by international-
ly coordinated interventions by producers, and, later, in cooperation with 
consumers. 
The f i rst major attempt at controlling the world coffee market by Brazil 
was undertaken in 1906. This took the form of a unilateral action to ar-
rest the process which had brought down the price of coffee to very low 
levels. These price falls were attributed to the overplanting of coffee 
bushes in the last decade of the nineteenth century. The bumper crop of 
1906 induced the presidents of the three major coffee producing states of 
Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro to authorize the State of Sao 
Paulo to bring up and store the excess coffee supplies. When the world 
market prices recovered, these stocks would gradually be released (Gor-
don, 1984; p. 208). This policy was called 'valorizacion', to value high, 
and was financed by a tax on each bag of coffee exported. The direct 
effect of these measures was an increase in world market prices as the 
demand for coffee was price inelastic, and as Brazil's market share of 70% 
gave absolute dominance. At the same time production was strongly en-
couraged by high prices and the Brazilian coffee frontier advanced into 
new areas. In 1917/18 the same policies were applied, and in 1921 the 
Federal government took over the organization. It negotiated loans with 
foreign bankers to finance the capital intensive regulation of an orderly 
flow to the market at stable (higher) prices (Gordon, 1984; p. 210). 
The policy of 'valorizacion' was brought into serious difficulties, when 
both demand for and the price of coffee fell drastically in 1929 and 1930, 
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caused by the economic cr is is in the industr ia l ized wo r l d . Supply by tha t 
time had increased to unprecedented levels, and stocks had accumulated. 
Demand suddenly col lapsed. In 1930 the National Coffee Council was es-
tab l ished. I t was f inanced by a f u r t h e r tax on each bag of coffee. It was 
charged wi th the destruct ion of excess s tocks, the banning of new coffee 
plant ing and the establishment of product ion quotas (F isher , 1972; p .58) . 
Between 1931 and 1943 seventy-seven million bags were dest royed. Ban-
n ing of new plant ing though was not v e r y successful (F isher , p . 62) . 
Unti l 1937 Brazi l continued its policy of 'va lor izacion ' , as a resul t of 
which i ts market share had declined to 57% (Pan American Coffee Bureau, 
1965). Colombia, near to the important US market , had benef i t ted from 
the h igh prices resu l t ing from Brazi l 's retent ion po l icy , and had augment-
ed i ts wor ld market share from only 3% in 1912 to 11% in 1937. Af r ican 
product ion had not yet appeared in s igni f icant volume on the market , bu t 
the UK, Portugal and France encouraged the i r colonies to cul t ivate coffee, 
in an e f fo r t to break Brazi l 's monopoly (Payer , 1975; p. 158). Ivory 
Coast, Cameroon, Angola, Kenya and Tanzania proved ve ry suitable fo r 
the cu l t ivat ion of both Robusta and Arabica coffees. 
Brazi l had suf fered serious economic losses by i ts uni lateral actions on 
the wor ld markets, and between 1931 and 1937 i t made repeated ef for ts to 
induce the other Latin American coffee expor ters to agree to an in te r -
national expor t rest r ic t ion scheme (Hickmann, 1980; p. 27) . As l i t t le 
resulted i t decided to t r y to regain i ts former market share and augment-
ed expor ts . In 1939 t hough , wi th the outbreak of the Second World War 
in Europe, th is second important market became completely inaccessible, 
and prices fel l heav i ly . Europe by tha t time accounted for 40% of world 
imports (F isher , 1972; p. 50) . 
Th is cr is is b rough t a wi l l ingness on the par t of Lat in American produc-
ers of mild coffee (Centra l America, Colombia) to engage in a dialogue on 
the coordination of internat ional coffee market ing . On the in i t ia t ive of the 
US the In ter American Coffee Agreement was set up wi th fourteen Latin 
American expor t ing count r ies . Export quotas to the US and the rest of 
the wor ld were prov ided fo r (Rowe, 1963; p. 14). Dur ing the war the 
f i xed pr ice (13.4 cents per pound) was at f i r s t p ro f i tab le , bu t la ter , as 
the general pr ice level rose, th is f i xed pr ice made cul t ivat ion less a t t rac t -
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i ve . Brazi l ian product ion declined cont inuously from 1933 onwards unt i l 
the end of the war , whereas Colombian product ion gradual ly increased. El 
Salvador and Guatemala product ion remained unchanged. Af r ican produc-
t i o n , however, t reb led in the period 1933-1945. Indonesian product ion was 
v i r t ua l l y ex t inc t as a resul t of the Japanese invasion (Rowe, 1963; 
p. 14) . 
A f te r the war , Europe put up ta r i f f bar r ie rs against coffee from dollar 
areas and favoured imports from non-dol lar count r ies , because of i ts 
balance of payment problems. Robusta coffees from ( fo rmer ) European 
colonies in Af r ica received preferent ia l t reatment . The growth in the 
soluble coffee market , fo r which Robusta wi th i ts composition and low 
pr ice is ve ry su i ted , led to a high demand fo r Af r ican coffee af ter the 
war. Hickmann ascribes the upsurge of Af r ican product ion also to the 
avai labi l i ty of vast areas suitable fo r coffee cu l t i va t ion , the avai labi l i ty of 
cheap labour and the high wor ld market prices which prevai led on the 
world market in the early f i f t ies (Hickmann, 1980; p. 35). A lso, because 
there was no du t y at European borders on coffee from ACP count r ies , 
Af r ican countr ies gained a competit ive edge over Latin American expor t -
e rs , who paid 9.6% ad valorem. In Cameroon, I vo ry Coast, Kenya, Zaire 
and Angola product ion began f i r s t on large estates developed by Europ-
eans, bu t cu l t ivat ion also proved ve ry suitable fo r smallholder product ion 
because of i ts simple product ion and processing (De Graaf; 1986; p. 73) . 
Af r ican expor t policy was the d i rec t sale. I t d id not aim at stocking cof-
fee in order to raise pr ices, especially as storage space was in shor t 
supply (Dinham and Hines, 1983; p. 56) . In the years fol lowing the war 
Brazi l released its accumulated stocks tha t had not been burned and from 
1947 to 1952 (except fo r 1950) expor ts were larger than product ion (H ick -
mann, 1980; p. 26) . 
The grave f ros t in Brazi l of 1953 and the outbreak of the war in Korea 
in 1952 had forced prices u p , bu t these also ref lected the under ly ing 
si tuat ion of scarc i ty , a s i tuat ion which had not existed fo r 25 years 
(Rowe, 1963; p. 14) . Demand in Europe was r is ing rap id l y , whereas 
product ion was character is t ical ly slow to respond. Stocks were at a low 
level . This had already caused prices to jump from 0.18 dol lar per pound 
in 1946 to 0,50 dollar per pound fo r Brazi l ian Santos coffee in 1950. They 
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remained at tha t level unt i l 1953 when the pr ice rose to near ly 1,00. 
Hickmann earmarks th is as a crucial period explaining the upsurge in 
product ion in the late f i f t ies and early sixt ies which led to the accumu-
lation of stocks in producing countr ies (Hickmann, 1980; p. 35) . The high 
wor ld market prices were passed on to the producers in the most import -
ant producing count r ies , and caused an enormous expansion of the area 
under coffee cul t ivat ions (Geer, 1972; p. 125). Th is had occurred in 
A f r i ca , in Central America and above a l l , Brazi l 's state of Parana. 
Akiyama estimated product ion increase in the period 1956-1959 at the ve ry 
h igh rate of 20% per annum (Akiyama, 1982; p. 1 ) . 
The high prices prevai l ing between 1950 and 1954 had weakened US 
demand by 23%, which by then was 60% of wor ld impor ts . The r is ing p ro -
duct ion and the slackening demand caused the beginning of a long plunge 
in wor ld market prices which fel l to a level of 0.34 dol lar per pound in 
1962. A f r ican expor ters had expanded the i r market share at the expense 
of the t rad i t ional Latin American producers , who in th is way also lost the 
ab i l i ty to control the pr ice by agreements among the Latin American coun-
t r ies ( B r o w n , 1980; p. 27) . Several attempts were made to prevent a f u r -
the r drop in p r i ces , and these led to an agreement res t r i c t i ng expor ts in 
1957. Th is was followed by producer agreements on a broader base. In 
1962 the Internat ional Coffee Agreement was signed by main expor t ing and 
import ing countr ies and led to an ef fect ive freeze of expor t market 
shares. For prices the aim of the 1962 agreement was to prevent these 
from dropp ing below the i r 1962 level . Stocks though were at tha t time at 
record h igh levels, exceeding annual expor ts . The bu lk of these stocks 
were kept by Brazi l who, by threaten ing to dump them on the market , 
induced other expor ters to join the agreement. Production expansion had 
led to excess p roduc t ion . In order to alleviate th is oversupply si tuat ion 
Brazi l began a massive t ree eradication programme, dest roy ing 40% of the 
total t ree stock between 1962 to 1968. The IBC provided farmers wi th 
funds to d ive rs i f y the product ion and prohib i ted f u r t h e r coffee p lant ing 
(Hickmann, 1980; p. 49) . Moderate f ros ts between 1962 and 1967, wi th a 
grave f ros t in 1966 exacerbated the effect of the eradication programme. 
Also, the disease, coffee r u s t , caused a reduct ion in ou tpu t . In 1967 
Brazi l had to abandon i ts pol icy of eradication as the t ree stock had been 
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reduced too much and a replanting programme was formalized. 
Between 1963 and 1968 prices remained above the 1962 level, but were 
since 1963 subject to continuous decline. Stocks though were declining 
gradually due to Brazilian policy of eradication. 
A frost in 1969, though classified as moderate by the Brazilian Agro-
nomical Institute of Campina (Table 2.4), reduced output in Brazil and 
brought prices back to the level of 0,50 dollar per pound. 
Over-production, however, remained a problem and this was acknow-
ledged during negotiations for extending the Coffee agreement in 1968. 
Formal production goals were set for countries and penalties were adopted 
for non compliance with production programmes (Brown, 1980; p. 32). 
The chronic oversupply situation of the sixties was replaced by a situa-
tion of more or less an equilibrium in the early seventies, brought about 
by a series of frosts, droughts and excessive rainfall in Brazil's produc-
ing areas in 1970/71 and 1971/72. 
The rising prices of the early seventies shifted market control to pro-
ducers. In 1973 the devaluation of the dollar and the accompanying in-
security in the monetary field induced a speculation-aggravated price 
rise. Other commodity prices also reacted and Cooper and Lawrence 
attribute this to the insecurity in the dollar value, the strong increase in 
the global monetary aggregates, and the physical scarcity of a number of 
commodities combined with increasing economic growth in the industrialized 
countries (Cooper and Lawrence, 1975; p. 682). 
In 1974 prices fell and the breakdown of a producer alliance led to 
price competition among the largest exporters, further reducing prices. 
In 1975 the most severe frost of the century destroyed 50% of the Brazil-
ian production capacity and had a pronounced impact on future harvests, 
as trees were affected. Also heavy rains in Colombia, the outbreak of 
civil war in Angola and the marketing problems of Uganda, put strains on 
prices, which sky-rocketed to unprecented levels. Demand nevertheless 
rose by 3%, because of the uncertainty of the availability of coffee in the 
medium term. The very low stock levels, which had been run down since 
1962 also influenced demand. Singh remarks that if one single variable 
were to be used as a basis for explaining price developments in coffee, 
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world producer stocks would be the most useful (Singh, 1977; p. 42). 
Producer stocks showed a long term cycle that fair ly accurately mirrored 
the price cycle with an all time low in the mid f i f t ies, a very high level 
during the sixties and lower but sizeable levels in the early seventies. 
Akiyama also discerns this relationship (Akiyama, 1982; p. 8). 
After the frost the Brazilian government implemented a policy of en-
couraging coffee growers to replant coffee trees in the less frost-prone 
areas in the north. This makes that in the future Brazilian production if 
succesful will fluctuate less. Following the frost, prices remained over 175 
dollar per pound, having reached its all time high in eighteen months of 
3,04 dollar in early 1977. Exports in 1976/77 and 1977/78 were consider-
ably lower than the average for the previous five coffee years (1971/72-
1975/76). The 1978/79 season meant a recovery of exports as Brazilian 
production picked up, and prices slid. Moderate frosts in 1978 and 
especially 1979 again brought prices to higher levels and prevented the 
imposition of export restrictions as had been agreed to in the 1976 Coffee 
Agreement. 
In 1980 the composite indicator remained below the level of 1.34 dollar 
for 15 consecutive days and quotas were installed. Production in the 
1979/80 reached the very high level of 99 million bags and since then a 
gradual building up of stocks has been taking place. In 1985 a level of 30 
million bags available for export (or 6 months of consumption in the con-
suming member countries) was reached. Since quotas were in operation 
between 1980 and 1986, prices remained virtually constant between the 
price range of 1,20 to 1,40 dollar per pound. Production is currently ex-
panding in a number of low cost producing countries such as India and 
Indonesia, whereas production in Angola has virtually disappeared, com-
pared to the pre-1975 situation. 
